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Governments of developing countries typically spend between 15 and 30 percent of GDP. 
Hence, small changes in the efficiency of public spending could have a major impact on 
GDP and on the attainment of the government’s objectives. The first challenge that 
stakeholders face is measuring efficiency. This paper attempts such quantification and 
has two major parts. The first one estimates efficiency as the distance between observed 
input-output combinations and an efficiency frontier (defined as the maximum attainable 
output for a given level of inputs).  This frontier is estimated for several health and 
education output indicators by means of the Free Disposable Hull (FDH) and Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) techniques. Both input-inefficiency (excess input 
consumption to achieve a level of output) and output-inefficiency (output shortfall for a 
given level of inputs) are scored in a sample of 140 countries using data from 1996 to 
2002. The second part of the paper seeks to verify empirical regularities of the cross-
country variation in efficiency.  Results show that countries with higher expenditure 
levels register lower efficiency scores, as well as countries where the wage bill is a larger 
share of the government’s budget. Similarly, countries with higher ratios of  public to 
private financing of the service provision score lower efficiency, as do countries plagued 
by the HIV/AIDS epidemic and those with higher income inequality.  Countries with 
higher aid-dependency ratios also tend to score lower in efficiency, probably due to the 
volatility of this type of funding that impedes medium term planning and budgeting.   
Though no causality may be inferred from this exercise, it points at different factors to 
understand why some countries might need more resources than others to achieve similar 
educational and health outcomes. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
Governments of developing countries typically spend resources equivalent to between 15 
and 30 percent of GDP. Hence, small changes in the efficiency of public spending could 
have a significant impact on GDP and on the attainment of the government’s objectives 
whichever these are. The first challenge faced by stakeholders is measuring and scoring 
efficiency. This paper attempts such quantification.  Additionally it verifies statistically 
some empirical regularities that describe the cross country-variation in the estimated 
efficiency scores.  
 
The paper has four chapters following this Introduction. The first one presents the 
methodology that defines efficiency as the distance from the observed input-output 
combinations to an efficient frontier.  This frontier, defined as the maximum attainable 
output for a given input level, is estimated using the Free Disposable Hull (FDH) and 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) techniques.  The exercise focuses on health and 
education expenditure because they absorb the largest share of most countries’ budgets, 
and because of lack of data availability for international comparisons in other types of 
expenditures. 
 
The second chapter estimates the efficiency frontiers for nine education output indicators 
and four health output indicators, based on a sample of 140 countries and data for 1996-
2002  Both input-efficiency (excess input consumption to achieve a level of output) and 
output-efficiency (output shortfall for a given level of inputs) are scored. The chapter 
presents both the single input-single-output and the multiple-inputs multiple-outputs 
frameworks. In addition, this chapter explores how expenditure efficiency has changed 
over time.  
 
The third chapter seeks to identify empirical regularities that explain cross-country 
variation in the efficiency scores.  Using a Tobit panel approach, this chapter shows that 
higher expenditure levels are generally associated with lower efficiency scores.   
Similarly, countries in which the wage bill is a larger share of the total budget tend to 
have lower efficiency scores. Three other variables that explain the cross country 
variation in efficiency scores are the degree of urbanization (positively correlated with 
efficiency, the prevalence of the HIV/AIDS epidemic (negatively associated with 
efficiency scores), and inequality in income distribution (higher inequality associated 
with lower efficiency). 
 
The fourth and last chapter summarizes the conclusions. 
 
II. Measuring Efficiency: Methodologies and Overview of the Literature 
 
The object of this chapter is to briefly describe the specific empirical methods applied in 
this paper to measure efficiency and to survey the literature more directly related to the 
analysis of public expenditure efficiency. Empirical and theoretical measures of 
efficiency are based on ratios of observed output levels to the maximum that could have   2
been obtained given the inputs utilized. This maximum constitutes the efficient frontier 
which will be the benchmark for measuring the relative efficiency of the observations. 
There are multiple techniques to estimate this frontier, surveyed recently by Murillo-
Zamorano (2004), and the methods have been recently applied to examine the efficiency 
of public spending in several counties.  These are the topics of the next two sections. 
 
 
II.1.  Methods for Measuring Efficiency. 
 
The origin of the modern discussion of efficiency measurement dates back to Farell 
(1957), who identified two different ways in which productive agents could be 
inefficient: one, they could use more inputs than technically required to obtain a given 
level of output, or two, they could use a sub-optimal input combination given the input 
prices and their marginal productivities. The first type of inefficiency is termed technical 
inefficiency while the second one is known as allocative inefficiency. 
 
These two types of inefficiency can be represented graphically by means of the unit 
isoquant curve in Figure1. The set of minimum inputs required for a unit of output lies on 
the isoquant curve YY’. An agent’s input-output combination defined by bundle P 
produces one unit of output using input quantities X1 and X2.  Since the same output can 
be achieved by consuming less of both inputs along the radial back to bundle R, the 
segment RP represents the inefficiency in resource utilization. The technical efficiency 
(TE), input-oriented, is therefore defined as TE = OR/OP. Furthermore, the producer 
could achieve additional cost reduction by choosing a different input combination.  The 
least cost combination of inputs that produces one unit of output is given by point T, 
where the marginal rate of technical substitution is equal to the input price ratio. To 
achieve this cost level implicit in the optimal combination of inputs, input use needs to be 





























The focus of this paper is measuring technical efficiency, given the lack of comparable 
input prices across the countries. This concept of efficiency is narrower than the one 
implicit in social welfare analysis. That is, countries may be producing the wrong output 
very efficiently (at low cost). We abstract from this consideration (discussed by Tanzi 
2004), focusing on the narrow concept of efficiency. 
 
Numerous techniques have been developed over the past decades to tackle the empirical 
problem of estimating the unknown and unobservable efficient frontier (in this case the 
isoquant YY”). These may be classified using several taxonomies. The two most widely 
used catalog methods into parametric or non-parametric, and into stochastic or 
deterministic. The parametric approach assumes a specific functional form for the 
relationship between the inputs and the outputs as well as for the inefficiency term 
incorporated in the deviation of the observed values from the frontier. The non-
parametric approach calculates the frontier directly from the data without imposing 
specific functional restrictions. The first approach is based on econometric methods, 
while the second one uses mathematical programming techniques. The deterministic 
approach considers all deviations from the frontier explained by inefficiency, while the 
stochastic focus considers those deviations a combination of inefficiency and random 
shocks outside the control of the decision maker. 
 
This paper uses non-parametric methods to avoid assuming specific functional forms for 
the relationship between inputs and outputs or for the inefficiency terms. A companion 
paper will explore the parametric approach, along the lines proposed by Greene (2003). 
The remainder of the section briefly describes the two methods: the Free Disposable Hull 
(FDH) and the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
 
The FDH method imposes the least amount of restrictions on the data, as it only assumes 
free-disposability of resources.  Figure 2 illustrates the single-input single-output case of 
FDH production possibility frontier. Countries A and B use input XA and XB to produce 
outputs YA and YB, respectively. The input efficiency score for country B is defined as the 
quotient XA/XB. The output efficiency score is given by the quotient YB/YA. A score of 
one implies that the country is on the frontier. An input efficiency score of 0.75 indicates 
that this particular country uses inputs in excess of the most efficient producer to achieve 
the same output level. An output efficiency score of 0.75   indicates that the inefficient 
producer attains 75 percent of the output obtained by the most efficient producer with the 























Figure 2 Free Disposal Hull (FDH) production possibility frontier 
 
The second approach, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), assumes that linear combinations of 
the observed input-output bundles are feasible. Hence it assumes convexity of the production set 
to construct an envelope around the observed combinations. Figure 3 illustrates the single input-
single output DEA production possibility frontier. In contrast to the vertical step-ups of FDH 
frontier, DEA frontier is a piecewise linear locus connecting all the efficient decision-making 
units (DMU). The feasibility assumption, displayed by the piecewise linearity, implies that the 
efficiency of C, for instance, is not only ranked against the real performers A and D, called the 
peers of C in the literature, but also evaluated with a virtual decision maker, V, which employs a 
weighted collection of A and D inputs to yield a virtual output. DMU C, which would have been 
considered to be efficient by FDH, is now lying below the variable returns to scale (VRS, further 
defined below) efficiency frontier, XADF, by DEA ranking. This example shows that FDH tends 
to assign efficiency to more DMUs than DEA does. The input-oriented technical efficiency of C 












































VRS   5
If constant returns to scale (CRS) characterize the production set, the frontier may be 
represented by a ray extending from the origin through the efficient DMU (ray OA). By 
this standard, only A would be rated efficient. The important feature of the XADF 
frontier is that this frontier reflects variable returns to scale. The segment XA reflects 
locally increasing returns to scale (IRS), that is, an increase in the inputs results in a 
greater than proportionate increase in output. Segments AD and DF reflect decreasing 
returns to scale. It is worth noticing that constant returns to scale technical efficiency 
(CRSTE) is equal to the product of variable returns to scale technical efficiency (VRSTE) 
and scale efficiency (SE). Accordingly, DMU D is technically efficient but scale 
inefficient, while DMU C is neither technically efficient nor scale efficient. The scale 
efficiency of C is calculated as YN/YV.  For more detailed exploration of returns to 
scale, readers are referred to Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) and Banker, Charnes, 




The limitations of the non-parametric method derive mostly from the sensitivity of the 
results to sampling variability, to the quality of the data and to the presence of outliers.  
This has led recent literature to explore the relationship between statistical analysis and 
non-parametric methods (Simar and Wilson, 2000). Some solutions have been advanced.  
For instance, confidence intervals for the efficiency scores can be estimated using 
asymptotic theory in the single input case (for input-efficiency estimators) or single-
output (in the output efficiency) case, given these are shown to be maximum likelihood 
estimators (Banker, 1993 and Goskpoff, 1996). For multiple input-output cases the 
distribution of the efficiency estimators is unknown or quite complicated and analysts 
recommend constructing the empirical distribution of the scores by means of 
bootstrapping methods (Simar and Wilson, 2000). Other solutions to the outlier or noisy 
data consist in constructing a frontier that does not envelop all the data point, building an 
expected minimum input function or expected maximum output functions (Cazals, 
Florens and Simar, 2002, and  Wheelock and Wilson, 2003). Another limitation of the 
method, at least in the context in which  we will apply it, is the inadequate treatment of 
dynamics, given the lag between input consumption (public expenditure) and output 
production (health and education outcomes). 
 
II.2. Overview of Precursor Papers  
 
There is abundant literature measuring productive efficiency of diverse types of decision 
making units. For instance, there are papers measuring efficiency of museums (Bishop 
and Brand, 2003), container terminals (Cullinane and Song, 2003), electric generation 
plants (Cherchye and Post 2001), banks (Wheelock and Wilson, 2003), schools 
(Worthington, 2001) and hospitals (Bergess and Wilson, 1998), among others. Few 
papers, however, analyze aggregate public sector spending efficiency using cross-country 
data. These are the direct precursors of this paper  and are the focus of this section’s 
survey. 
                                                 
2  The technical Appendix D provides more detailed exploration of the Data Envelopment Analysis, which 
shows how the peers are identified, how the virtual DMUs are constructed, and how weights to the different 
efficient DMUs and efficiency scores are calculated.   6
 
Gupta and Verhoeven (2001) employ the input-oriented FDH approach to assess the 
efficiency of government spending on education and health in 37 African countries in 
1984-1995. Using several output indicators for health and education, they construct 
efficiency frontiers for each of the indicators and for each of the time periods they 
considered. That is, they used a single input-single output for each time period.  They 
find that, on average, African countries are inefficient in providing education and health 
services relative to both Asian and the Western Hemisphere counties. They also report, 
however, an increase in the productivity of spending through time, as they document 
outward shifts in the efficiency frontier.  Finally the authors report a negative relationship 
between the input efficiency scores and the level of public spending, which leads them to 
conclude that higher educational attainment and health output requires efficiency 
improvement more than increased budgetary allocations. 
 
Evans and Tandon (2000) adopt a parametric approach to measure efficiency of national 
health systems for the World Health Organization, by estimating a fixed effects panel  of 
191 countries for the period 1993-1997. Health output was measured by the disability 
adjusted life expectancy (DALE) index, while health expenditures (public and private 
aggregated) and the average years of schooling of the adult population were considered 
as inputs. The output-efficiency score is defined as the ratio of actual performance above 
the potential maximum. The authors also introduce the square of the inputs (average 
years of schooling and expenditure), arguing it’s a second-order Taylor-series 
approximation to an unknown functional form. The fact that the quadratic terms are 
significant may be an indication of the importance of non-linearity, but may also reflect 
neglected dynamics or   heterogeneity in the sample (Haque, Pesaran and Sharma, 1999), 
given that both developed and developing nations were included. An interesting 
contribution of the paper is a construction of a confidence interval for the efficiency 
estimates through a Monte-Carlo procedure. These authors document a positive 
relationship between their efficiency scores and the level of spending. The more efficient 
health systems are those of Oman, Chile and Costa Rica. The more inefficient countries 
are all African:  Zimabawe, Zambia, Namibia, Botswana, Malawi and Lesotho. 
 
Jarasuriya and Woodon (2002) also adopt a parametric approach  to estimate efficiency 
of health and education provision in a sample of developing countries. The authors 
estimate the efficiency frontier by econometric methods. These authors consider 
separately an educational attainment indicator (net primary enrollment) and a health 
output indicator (life expectancy) and estimate a functional linear relationship between 
these output indicators and three inputs: per capita GDP, spending per-capita, and the 
adult literacy rate.  Using a panel of 76 countries for the period 1990 to 1998, they found 
no relationship between expenditure and the educational or health output variables when 
they include the per-capita GDP. This led the authors to conclude that spending more is 
not a guarantee to obtain better education or health results. The authors do not point at the 
correlation between the two variables as a possible cause of this problem, which we 
discuss in the next section. The countries with the lowest efficiency in health indicators 
are all African (Malawi, Zambia, Mozambique, Ethiopia) as well as in education 
attainment (Ethiopia, Niger, Burkina Faso).   7
 
The authors go further by attempting to explain the cross-country variation in efficiency 
and find that the degree of urbanization and the quality of bureaucracy are the most 
relevant variables. To capture possible non-linearity, the authors introduce these variables 
squared.  This stage of their work poses several problems. First, it is possible that the 
(non-linear) quadratic terms reflect heterogeneity across countries and dynamics across 
time. As shown by Haque, Pesaran, and Sharma (1999), this would produce inconsistent 
estimates. Second, the authors do not adjust for the fact that the dependent variable 
(efficiency scores) is censored, given that it can adopt only values between zero and one. 
And third, the authors do not consider the serial correlation of the efficiency scores 
(Simar and Wilson, 2004) 
 
Greene (2003a) combines the previous two papers in the sense he concentrated on health 
efficiency only using the WHO panel data and explained inefficiency scores variation 
across the sample of counties.  Greene’s stochastic frontier estimation is much more 
general and flexible, as it allows for time variation of the coefficients and heterogeneity 
in the countries’ sensitivity to the explanatory variables.  The author first estimates a 
health production function using expenditure (public and private together) and education 
as inputs, and then explains inefficiency with a set of explanatory variables of which the 
only significant ones are the income inequality measure, GDP per capita and a dummy 
variable for tropical location. 
 
Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2003) examine the efficiency of public spending using a 
non-parametric approach.  First, they construct composite indicators of  public sector 
performance for 23 OECD countries, using variables that capture quality of 
administrative functions, educational and health attainment, and the quality of 
infrastructure.  Taking the performance indicator as the output, and total public spending 
as the input, they perform single-input, single-output FDH to rank the expenditure 
efficiency of the sample.  Their results show that countries with small public sectors 
exhibit the highest overall performance.  
 
Afonso and St. Aubyn (2004) address the efficiency of expenditure in education and 
health for a sample of OECD countries applying both DEA and FDH. This paper presents 
detailed results by comparing input-oriented and output-oriented efficiency 
measurements. The small overlap of the samples limits the comparability of these results 
with those presented in the next section. An apparently strange result, reported in earlier 
drafts of the paper, was the inclusion of Mexico as one of the benchmark countries (on 
the efficiency frontier).  The result is strange given that the sample is the OECD 
countries, and it counterintuitive. This is the result of Mexico having very low spending 
and low education attainment results, hence it cam be considered as the “origin” of the 
efficiency frontier.  The next chapter discusses this topic and reports similar 
counterintuitive results but for other countries. 
   8
 
 
III.   Empirical Results 
 
III.1. Input and Output Indicators: Description, Assumptions and Limitations 
 
Cross-country comparisons assume some homogeneity across the world in the production 
technology of health and education.
3 There are two particular aspects in which the 
homogeneity assumption is important.  First, the comparison assumes that there is a small 
number of factors of production that are the same across countries.  Any omission of an 
important factor will yield as a result a high efficiency ranking of the country that uses 
more of the omitted input.  Second, the comparison requires that the quality of the inputs 
is more or less the same, with the efficiency scores biased in favor of countries where the 
quality is of higher grade. 
 
Factor heterogeneity will not be a problem, as long as it is evenly distributed across 
countries. It will be problematic if there are differences between countries in the average 
quality of a factor (Farrell, 1957). The exercise that we present suffers from this 
limitation, given that the main input in both production technologies is used more 
intensively  in richer countries (with higher per-capita GDP).  The main input is  public 
spending per capita on education and health measured in constant 1995 US dollars in PPP 
terms. A clear positive association between this variable and per-capita GDP can be 
verified (Figures 4 and 5). 
 
This positive association between expenditure and the level of economic development (as 
measured by per-capita-GDP) may be explained by several reasons.. One of them could 
be the Balassa-Samuelson effect, according to which price levels in wealthier countries 
tend to be higher than in poorer countries.
 4 This applies to both final goods and factor 
prices. Thus price of the same service (health or education, for instance) will be higher  in 
the country with higher GDP. Similarly, wages in the relatively richer counties are 
higher, given the higher marginal productivity of labor, which will tend to increase costs, 
especially in labor-intensive activities as health and education. 
 
Figure 4 can be interpreted as evidence of the validity of Wagner’s hypothesis at the 
cross-country level. This hypothesis, postulates that there is a tendency for governments 
to increase their activities as economic activity increases. Since 1890 Wagner postulated 
that economic development implied rising complexities that required more governmental 
activity, or that the elasticity of demand for publicly provided services, in particular 
education was greater than one.  This hypothesis has been tested econometrically (Chang, 
2002) in time series and cross-country settings, showing that this is nothing particular of 
the series used for the present study. 
                                                 
3 See Table B.5 in Appendix B for the list of countries included in the study. 
4 The Balassa-Samuelson effect refers to the fact that price levels are higher in richer countries than in 
poorer countries.  It can be shown that relative wages and relative prices are a function of the marginal 
productivity of labor in the traded goods. Given higher capital abundance in the richer countries, the 
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Figure 4. Public Expenditure  and GDP (both per capita and in logs) 
 
Previous studies that measured the efficiency of public spending recognized the positive 
association and suggested alternative solutions.  One possibility is to split the sample by 
groups of countries (Gupta and Verhoeven, 2001). We follow this approach by excluding 
the industrialized nations from the sample, and by presenting most of the results clustered 
regionally (Africa (AFR), East Asia and Pacific(EAP), Latin America and Caribbean 
(LAC), Middle-East and North Africa (MNA) and South Asia (SAS)). A second 
alternative incorporates directly the per-capita GDP as a factor of production, jointly with 
expenditure and other inputs (Jarasuriya and Woodon 2002). The problem with this 
approach is that it combines variables derived from a production function approach, and 
hence with clear interpretation, with others (GDP per capita) that are difficult to interpret 
from any viewpoint. When the two types of variables are combined, their effects cannot 
be disentangled. 
 
A third option consists in using as an input the orthogonal component of public 
expenditure to GDP
5. We scored the efficiency using as input both the original 
expenditure variable and the orthogonalized variable.  The goodness-of-fit of each model 
was gauged based on the frequency distribution of the inefficiency measures, as 
suggested by. Farrell (1957) and Varian (1990).  Comparing the efficiency distributions 
(Figures 5) it is clear that the orthogonalized expenditure version produces distributions 
that are not skewed towards extreme inefficient outcomes. On this basis, the paper 
considered the orthogonal component of expenditure on health and education. 
 
 
                                                 
5 The orthogonalized expenditure variable is the residual of the linear regression between pubic expenditure 
and GDP per capita. Since residuals may take positive and negative values, the variable was right-shifted to 
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Figure 5. Density of Efficiency Scores – Gross Primary School Enrollment 
 
This paper uses nine indicators of education output and four indicators of health output.
 6  
The education indicators are: primary school enrollment (gross and net), secondary 
school enrollment (gross and net), literacy of youth, average years of school, first level 
complete, second level complete, and learning scores. Though the ideal educational 
output indicator are comparable learning scores, international assessments are based on 
samples mostly composed of developed nations, limiting the applicability to the present 
paper. However, Crouch and Fasih (2004) recently combined several international 
assessments to obtain a larger sample of comparable results.
7 Unfortunately they only do 
it for one period.  The correlation between the learning scores and other output variables 
is high (.81 with net secondary school enrollment and .76 with average years of school), 
as shown in Figure 6
8.  The health output indicators are: life expectancy at birth, 
immunization (DPT
9 and measles), and the disability-adjusted life expectancy (DALE).  
 
The cross-country comparisons with this set of indicators assume some form of data 
homogeneity, which might be problematic given the diversity of counties in the sample 
considered.  Even for a more homogeneous group of countries, such as the OECD, there 
is call for caution when comparing expenditure levels in member countries (Jounard, 
                                                 
6 The data sources are: the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI), Barro-Lee database, and 
Crouch and Fasih (2004)  the World Health Organization (Mathers et al, 2000).A complete list of variables 
and data sources can be found in Table B.6 of Appendix B. 
7 Crouch and Fasih (2004) consider several international tests of learning achievement in math, science and 
literacy applied at different levels of the school system.  The tests are the following: TIMSS (Third 
International Mathematics and Science Survey),  PIRLS (Progress in International Literacy Study), PISA 
(program for International Student assessment), Reading Literacy Study,  LLECE (Laboratorio  Since the 
tests have different samples, they converted all test scores through iterative comparisons to a single 
numeraire.Latinoamericano de Evaluaciond ela Calidad de la Educacion, SACMEQ (Southern Africa 
Consortium for Monitoring of Education Quality), MLA (Monitoring Learning Achievement) 
8 The correlation coefficients and Figure 6 exclude developed nations for the Crouch and Fasih (2004) 
sample. 
9 DPT is Diphtheria-Pertussis and Tetanus   11
et.al.  2003). There is very little to do to overcome this limitation, except subdivide the 
sample into different groups.  Probably a regional aggregation can be useful, but even at 
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Figure 6. Correlation between Learnings Scores and Other Education Indicators 
 
Other four limitations of the analysis arising from the particular data sources are:  First, 
the level of aggregation.  The paper uses aggregate public spending on health and 
education, while using disaggregate measures of output, such as. primary enrollment or 
secondary enrollment.  Ideally, the input should be use separately public spending in 
primary and secondary education. Similarly, health care spending could be disaggregated 
into primary care level care and secondary level. The data can be disaggregated even 
further, by analyzing efficiency at the school or hospital levels.  Second, there are omitted 
factors of production.  This is especially true in education, as the paper did not consider 
private spending due to data constraints for developing nations.  If this factor were used 
more intensively in a particular group of countries, then the efficiency scores (reported in 
the next section) would be biased favoring efficiency in that group.  
 
The third limitation arising from the data is the combination of monetary and non-
monetary factors of production. The paper uses together with public expenditure, other 
non-monetary factors of production such as the ratio of teachers to students, in the case of 
education, or literacy of adults in the case of health and education.  Other factors of 
production that could have been used were the physical number of teaching hours (in 
education) or the number of doctors or in-patient beds, as Afonso and St. Aubyn did for 
the OECD countries. However, inexistent data for a large number of developing countries 
constrained the options. 
 
A fourth limitation arising from the selected indicators, is that these don’t allow for a 
good differentiation between outputs and outcomes. For instance, most of the indicators 
of education, such as completion and enrollment rates do not measure how much learning 
is taking place in a particular country. In education, this paper advances by considering 
the learning scores as one of the indicators.  In health, other outcomes such as the number   12
of sick-day leaves or the number of missed-school days because of health-related causes 
could be better reflections of outcomes.  Two of the selected health output indicators, 
DPT and measles immunization are delivered in vertical programs, that is, in campaigns 
that are relatively independent of basic health systems and therefore may not be good 
indicators of the actual quality of the health system. Finally, the fact that life expectancy 
is influenced by diet, lifestyle, and a clean environment, that to the extent that are not 
included as factors of production may bias the efficiency scores. 
 
 
III.2. Single Input-output Results  
 
III.2.1. FDH and DEA analysis: Education 
 
Figures 7a-c show both FDH and DEA estimation of the efficiency frontier for three of 
the nine output indicators: gross primary school enrollment, first level complete and 
learning scores. Individual country efficiency scores for the three indicators are reported 
in Table B.1-3 of Appendix B
10. The graphical efficiency frontiers for other output 
indicators can be found in Appendix B (Figure B.1). 
 
Figure 7.d illustrates the efficiency frontier for the learning scores if the developed 
countries are included in the sample, demonstrating the sensitivity of the results to the 
sample definition.  This fact is particularly acute in the case of learning scores which 
capture the quality of education dimension that no other indicator captures. While in the 
sample of developing countries Chile, Hungary and the Czech Republic are on the 
frontier; once the developed nations are included they appear as inefficient.  The 
complete set of efficiency scores (including and excluding the set of developed countries 
can be found in Table B.2 and B.3 in Appendix B

















                                                 
10 The efficiency scores of all the indicators can be found at the PRMED website indicated in footnote 1. 
11 The frontier depicted in Figure 7.d. excludes Japan, Korea, Ireland and Belgium to facilitate comparisons 
with the frontier without developed nations.   13
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Figure 7 Education Efficiency Frontier: Single Input and Single Output 
 
Several results may be highlighted: 
a.  In general, the rankings are robust to the output indicator selected. This can be can 
be verified by the Spearman rank-correlation coefficient (see Tables C.1 and C.2 
in Appendix C), that are all positive, significant and high. The range oscillates 
from a minimum of .53 to a maximum of .94, with the mean of .70. This result 
implies that countries appearing as efficient (or inefficient) according to one 
indicator, are ranked similarly when other output indicator is used.  
b.  Despite the orthogonalization by GDP, the relatively rich countries tend to be in 
the less efficient group, i.e. countries with higher per-capita GDP spend more than 
other countries in attaining similar education outcomes. Higher spending may 
reflect the higher cost of tertiary education. This is one factor that may help 
explain the stand-out of Estonia, Latvia, and Poland. Oil-rich countries, such as  
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, tend to be in the group of relatively more inefficient 
producers. 
c.  Another group of relatively inefficient producers are those with “average” 
expenditure levels but extremely low education attainment. Among those are 
mostly African counties (Angola, Niger, Burkina Faso, Sudan, and Ethiopia), 
some Middle Eastern countries (Djibouti, and Yemen) and South Asia 
(Bangladesh and Pakistan). Table B.1-3 in Appendix B list the output-efficiency 
scores for three of the indicators. 
d.  Output-efficiency rankings also vary with the selected output indicators. The 
spearman correlation coefficient of the output-efficiency scores (see Tables C.3 
and C.4 in Appendix) show that these are robust to the selected indicator, though 
the mean of the correlation coefficients is lower (.52) and the range is somewhat 
higher (.30 to .95) than those registered in the input-efficiency rankings. 
e.  In an attempt to identify clusters of more efficient countries and more inefficient 
countries, the top (and bottom) 10 percent of the efficiency ranking were selected 
for each of the indicators. If a country appeared in the efficient (inefficient) tail in 
three or more of the indicators, it was included in Table 1.    15
Table 1. Education Attainment: Single Input, Single Output 
 Input-Efficient  Output  Efficient 
More efficient  Uruguay, Korea, Dominican 
Republic, Indonesia, 
Guatemala, China, Bahamas, 
Bahrain, El Salvador 
Uruguay, Korea, Bahrain, 
Bahamas 
Least efficient  Botswana, South Africa, 
Kuwait, Tunisia, Lesotho, 
Barbados,  Saudi Arabia, 
Zimbawe, Namibia, Malaysia, 
St, Lucia, Jamaica,  St, 
Vincent, Latvia,  
Niger, Mali,  Tanzania,  
Burkina Fasso, Gunea-Bissau, 
Ethiopia, Guinea,  Burundi, 
Sudan, Sierra Leone, Chad 
 
f.  This clustering exercise reveals (Table 1) a group of African countries as the most 
inefficient.  Two oil-rich countries are included in this group as well. Among the 
more efficient group of countries we consistently find Uruguay, Korea, Bahamas, 
and Bahrain.  Explaining why these particular sets of countries appear in each 
cluster requires more in-depth analysis. The last section of this paper attempts to 
associate efficiency results with some explanatory variables. 
g.  To grasp the order of magnitudes of the deviations from the efficiency frontier, 
we computed an average for all indicators for the inefficient countries.  The input-
efficiency estimations indicate that the most inefficient decile could reach the 
same educational attainment levels by spending approximately 50 percent less. 
The output efficiency estimators indicate that, on average, with the expenditure 
level this group could reach educational attainment levels four times as high. 
h.  It is critical to note that even if a country appears as efficient, there might still be a 
significant discrepancy between the observed output level and the desired or 
target output level. For instance, Bahamas, Bahrain, Dominican Republic and 
Guatemala appear as efficient countries on the efficiency frontier or very close to 
it (Figure 7 a.1).  However, these countries are still far away from where Gabon or 
Brazil are, and could consider desirable to achieve those target enrollment rates.  
Both Guatemala and Dominican Republic spend two percent of GDP on 
education but have (net) secondary enrollment rates below 40 percent. And net 
primary enrollment is about 80 percent.  It would be difficult to argue that that is a 
desirable outcome, though it is an efficient one. Similarly, though Chile appears 
as efficient with learning scores of about 400, the country could still achieve 
higher learning scores of over 500 points at the cost of additional public spending.  
The important thing is that the country moves along the efficiency frontier to the 
higher target output level.  Countries can even improve efficiency by exploiting 
scale economies if they are operating in the increasing returns to scale zone of the 
production possibility frontier (output levels smaller than that of point A, Figure 
3) 
i.  The regional aggregation of the efficiency scores by each individual output 
indicator shows that scores are lower when they are input oriented (Table 2) than   16
when they are output oriented (Table 3).12This is especially true for ECA.  In 
general, we observe higher efficiency scores when primary enrollment is 
considered as the output indicator.  Scores are lower for secondary enrollment, 
especially when output-oriented measures are considered. Africa and MNA have 
similar levels of input-inefficiency: in most cases, both regions use public 
spending in excess of 35 percent than the benchmark cases.  EAP, ECA, LAC and 
SAS spend in excess between 20-30 percent of the benchmark level. The output 






Table 2. Educational Attainment: Input-Efficiency scores by regions across the world  
- Single Input, Single Output 
 AFR  EAP  ECA  LAC  MNA  SAS 
Gross  primary  enrollment  .69 .74 .67 .74  .65  .75 
Net  primary  enrollment  .68 .78 .72 .77  .68  .71 
Gross  Secondary  enrollment  .65 .69 .67 .69  .63  .70 
Net  secondary  enrollment  .64 .71 .71 .69  .64  .72 
Average years of school  .21  .36  .37  .32  .18  .25 
First  level  complete  .21 .43 .48 .36  .20  .26 
Second  level  complete  .22 .37 .33 .32  .19  .27 
Literacy  of  youth  .66 .73 .86 .72  .63  .72 
Table 3. Educational Attainment: Output-Efficiency scores by regions across the world 
- Single Input-Single Output 
 AFR  EAP  ECA  LAC  MNA  SAS 
Gross  primary  enrollment  .62 .79 .72 .82 .67  .72 
Net  primary  enrollment  .64 .93 .90 .93 .79  .78 
Gross  Secondary  enrollment  .23 .50 .70 .61 .54  .39 
Net  secondary  enrollment  .26 .58 .84 .66 .60  .44 
Average  years  of  school  .32 .63 .79 .60 .53  .38 
First  level  complete  .19 .49 .50 .36 .22  .20 
Second  level  complete  .09 .37 .38 .24 .26  .22 




                                                 
12 The regional aggregation is for illustrative purposes only and was computed as the simple average of the 
individual country scores obtained for the whole sample.  The scores were not computed by constructing 
separate efficiency frontiers for each region.  Hence, they do not reflect the heterogeneity in the individual 
country scores and possibly do not reflect adequately variations across regions.   17
III.2.2. FDH and DEA Analysis: Health 
 
This section considers the case of one input (public expenditure on health per capita in 
PPP terms) and four alternative output indicators: life expectancy at birth, DPT 
immunization, measles immunization, and the disability adjusted life expectancy (DALE) 
index which takes into account both mortality and illness. The efficiency frontiers for 
each indicator are computed using both the FDH and DEA methodologies. Figures 8a-d 
show the efficiency frontier for one indicator. The specific country rankings for two of 
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Figure 8. Health Efficiency Frontier: Single Input and Single Output 
 
Several results may be highlighted:  
 
a.  The input efficiency scores obtained for each of the output indicators are highly 
correlated. The Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient oscillates between .66 
and .94, with a mean of 0.81 (see Tables C.1 and C.2 in Appendix C).  This 
indicates that the efficiency ranking is very similar regardless of the output 
indicator being used. 
b.  Despite the orthogonalization by GDP the relatively rich countries tend to be in 
the less efficient group. The group of inefficient producers tend to concentrate in 
two groups of countries: one group of relatively rich countries like the Czech 
Republic, Croatia, Slovenia, and Hungary that have big expenditure levels and not 
extremely high output (input inefficiency) and other group of countries that spend  
relatively little but their output indicators could be substantially larger, like Sierra 
Leone, Namibia, Zimbawe, and Lesotho   19
c.  To capture this difference, it is convenient to examine the output- efficiency 
scoring (see Tables C.3 and C.4 in Appendix C).  The rankings between input and 
output orientations are highly correlated.  
d.  With the four output indicators deciles, more efficient and least efficient countries 
are listed in Table 4.  The group of least efficient countries could, on average, 
increase output significantly for a given expenditure level. For instance, the decile 
of most inefficient countries could almost double the disability-adjusted life 
expectancy (DALE) index to achieve the same efficiency as the benchmark. 
Similarly the DPT immunization would have to triple to achieve the same 
efficiency level than the benchmark developing countries. 
e.  The regional aggregation of the efficiency scores, by each individual output 
indicator shows that input efficiency scores (Table 5) are lower than output 
efficiency scores (Table  6).  This is especially true in ECA, LAC and MNA, and 
to a lesser extent in EAP and SAS. In Africa, both scores are strikingly similar, 
indicating that, on average, the region spend about 35 percent in excess of the 
benchmark cases to achieve the same output level.  Alternatively, the output level 
is 35 percent below comparable efficient countries that use the same input 
(expenditure) level.  
 
Table 4. Health Attainment: Single Input, Single Output 
 Input-Efficient  Output  Efficient 
More efficient  Korea, Malaysia, Thailand,  
Trinidad & Tobago,  Oman,  
United Arab Emirates, 
Mauritius, Kuwait, Chile 
Korea, Dominica,  Oman, 
United Arab Emirates, Anigua 
and Barbuda 
Least efficient  Argentina, Estonia, Czech 
Republic, Slovenia, 
Macedonia, Croatia, Namibia, 
Tunisia, Latvia, Hungary, 
Barbados 
Sierra Leone,  Ethipia, 
Burkina Fasso, Central 
African Republic,  Mali 
 
Table 5.  Health Attainment: Input-Efficiency scores by regions across the world 
 - Single Input, Single Output 
 AFR  EAP  ECA  LAC  MNA  SAS 
Life Expectancy at birth  .65  .72  .58  .69  .73  .69 
Immunization  DPT  .66 .73 .63 .68  .76  .71 
Immunization  Measles  .65 .73 .67 .69  .76  .71 
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Table 6. Health Attainment: Output-Efficiency scores by regions across the world 
- Single Input-Single Output 
 AFR  EAP  ECA  LAC  MNA  SAS 
Life Expectancy at birth  .63  .87  .91  .92  .90  .83 
Immunization  DPT  .62 .83 .95 .87  .90  .75 
Immunization  Measles  .63 .83 .95 .91  .90  .71 
DALE  .56 .83 .90 .90  .86  .79 
 
 
III.3.  Multiple Inputs and Multiple Outputs 
 
Both education and health attainment are not solely determined by public spending.   
Other inputs, such as private spending also affect the output indicators.  For health, the 
World Bank WDI database reports a comparable statistic across countries. Unfortunately, 
a comprehensive database of this variable does not exist for education:  For the education 
production technology we have multiple indicators of educational attainment, and three 
inputs (public spending, teachers per pupil, and adult literacy rate). In health, besides 
public spending, two other inputs were included: private spending and the education level 
of adults.  The analysis was limited to include up to three outputs  Too many output 
indicators will complicate the analysis, biasing efficiency scores towards one, increasing 
the variance of the estimators, and reducing their speed of convergence to the true 
efficiency estimators (Simar and Wilson, 2000; Groskopff, 1996) 
 
In education, the selected input-output combinations produce ranking that are somewhat 
similar: the average rank correlation coefficient is .53.  The frequency distribution of the 
efficiency estimators is similar in all the models, and as the model shifts from a basic 
two-input two-output model to a more complex three-input three–output model, the 
frequency distribution shifts to the right, that is,  more concentrated around more efficient 
results. 
 
The multi-input output model results (Table 7) in general confirm the results of Table 1. 
Some new countries that appear as efficient are Bangladesh, Congo and Argentina. In the 
case of Bangladesh and Congo, this is the result of considering literacy of adults as a 
factor of production, that in these countries is low, and hence, appearing as very efficient.  
Congo has also extremely low ratio of teachers per student, the other factor of production, 
reinforcing the bias towards the efficient score.  Within the least efficient countries, the 
models point at Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Botswana, Malaysia, and Saudi Arabia as the single-
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Table 7. Educational Attainment: Multiple Inputs, Multiple Outputs 
 Input-Efficient  Output  Efficient 




Chile, Brazil, Bahrain, 
Dominican Republic, Congo 
Least efficient  Zimbabwe, Lesotho, 
Botswana, Costa Rica, 
Swaziland, Saudi Arabia, 
Malaysia 
Sudan, Ghana, Tanzania, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Niger 
 
The regional aggregation for input and output efficiency scores using the multiple input-
output framework show (Tables 8 and 9) that as the model becomes more complex 
(adding inputs or outputs), scores tend to show more efficient regions. The input 
efficiency regional aggregation allows several interesting comparisons across the regions 
on the impact of an additional input on the efficiency scores.  For instance, the first two 
rows of Table 8 allow examination of the impact of adding literacy of adults as an 
additional input. The biggest impact is in the MNA region, followed by ECA and LAC 
while the others the increase in efficiency scores is more marginal
13. Output efficiency 
scores change substantially in MNA and Africa.  
 
Table 8. Education Attainment: Input-Efficiency scores by regions across the world 
- Multiple Inputs, Multiple Outputs 
  AFR EAP ECA LAC MNA  SAS 
 2 inputs (public expenditure, teachers per pupil) – 2 
outputs (gross primary and secondary enroll.) 
.88 .83 .72 .82 .73 .91 
3 inputs (public expenditure, teachers per pupil, 
literacy of adult) – 2 outputs (gross primary and 
secondary enroll.) 
.92 .89 .86 .89 .92 .96 
3 inputs (public expenditure, teachers per pupil, 
literacy of adult) – 2 outputs (net primary and 
secondary enroll.) 
.87 .94 .93  .93  .92 1.0 
2 inputs (public expenditure, literacy of adult)- 3 
outputs (first complete, second level complete, avg 
yrs of school) 
.78 .92 .95  .84  .80 .91 
3 inputs (public expenditure, literacy of adult, 
teachers per pupil)- 3 outputs (first complete, 
second level complete, avg yrs of school) 
.91 .97 .94  .89  .81 .95 
3 inputs (public expenditure, teachers per pupil, 
literacy of adult) – 3 outputs (literacy of youth, first 
level complete, second level complete) 




                                                 
13 The statistical significance of these changes has yet to be determined. The tests developed by Banker , 
and used in previous sections do not apply to the multiple-output cases we are analyzing here (Simar and 
Wilson, 2000)   22
Table 9. Education Attainment: Output-Efficiency scores by regions across the world 
 - Multiple Inputs,  Multiple Outputs 
  AFR EAP ECA LA  MNA  SAS 
2 inputs (public expenditure, teachers per pupil) – 2 
outputs (gross primary and secondary enroll.) 
.68 .83 .80 .85  .71 .79 
3 inputs (public expenditure, teachers per pupil, 
literacy of adult) – 2 outputs (gross primary and 
secondary enroll.) 
.82 .88 .89  .89  .91 .90 
3 inputs (public expenditure, teachers per pupil, 
literacy of adult) – 2 outputs (net primary and 
secondary enroll.) 
.79 .97 .96  .96  .92 1.0 
2 inputs (public expenditure, literacy of adult)- 3 
outputs (first complete, second level complete, avg 
yrs of school) 
.64 .87 .94  .80  .79 .83 
3 inputs (public expenditure, literacy of adult, 
teachers per pupil)- 3 outputs (first complete, 
second level complete, avg yrs of school) 
.86 .94 .93  .86  .80 .89 
3 inputs (public expenditure, teachers per pupil, 
literacy of adult) – 3 outputs (literacy of youth, first 
level complete, second level complete) 
.98 1.0 1.0  .98  .99 .99 
 
 
Rows 4 and 5 of Table 8 allow comparing the impact of adding the variable teachers per 
pupil as an additional input. In Africa the change is dramatic, while in ECA and MNA 
there is no significant change.  Further analysis is required to explain this differential 
response to the inclusion of this input. 
 
In health there are multiple combinations of inputs (public expenditure, private 
expenditure, and literacy of adults) and outputs (life expectancy at birth, immunization 
DPT, immunization measles, and Disability Adjusted life expectancy (DALE)). The 
combinations we selected produce rankings that are more homogeneous. The rank 
correlation is in the range of .65 to .98 (Tables 10-12).  Bangladesh appears as efficient, 
as well as Niger, mainly due to the inclusion as of the ( low ) levels of literacy of adults 
as an input, and hence,  making these countries to appear as efficient. 
Table 10. Health Attainment: Multiple Inputs, Multiple Outputs 
 Input-Efficient  Output  Efficient 
More efficient  Bangladesh, Malaysia, Costa 
Rica, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, 
Mauritius, Niger 
Bangladesh, Costa Rica, 
Kuwait, Malaysia,  Morocco, 
Mauritius, Oman, Niger 
Least efficient  Russia, Belarus,  Namibia, 
Romania, Estonia, Croatia,  
Lituania,, Hungary, Jordan 
Namibia, Togo, Ethiopia, 
Mozambique,  Cote d”Ivoire,  
Cameroon, Congo,  Central 
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Table 11. Health Attainment: Input-Efficiency scores by regions across the world 
- Multiple Inputs,  Multiple Outputs 
  AFR EAP ECA LA  MNA  SAS 
2 inputs (public expenditure, literacy of adult) – 2 
outputs (life expectancy, immunization DPT.) 
.85 .82 .72 .82  .91 .93 
3 inputs (public expenditure, private spending, 
literacy of adult) – 2 outputs (life expectancy, 
immunization DPT.) 
.86 .82 .74  .83  .91 .94 
3 inputs (public expenditure, private spending, 
literacy of adult) – 2 outputs (life expectancy, 
immunization measles.) 
.86 .82 .77  .83  .91 .94 
3 inputs (public expenditure, private spending, 
literacy of adult) – 3 outputs (life expectancy, 
immunization DPT., DALE) 




Table 12. Health Attainment: Output-Efficiency scores by regions across the world 
 - Multiple Inputs,  Multiple Outputs 
  AFR EAP ECA LA  MNA  SAS 
2 inputs (public expenditure, literacy of adult) – 2 
outputs (life expectancy, immunization DPT.) 
.81 .91 .97 .93  .97 .96 
3 inputs (public expenditure, private spending, 
literacy of adult) – 2 outputs (life expectancy, 
immunization DPT.) 
.81 .91 .97  .94  .97 .96 
3 inputs (public expenditure, private spending, 
literacy of adult) – 2 outputs (life expectancy, 
immunization measles.) 
.80 .91 .96  .94  .98 .96 
3 inputs (public expenditure, private spending, 
literacy of adult) – 3 outputs (life expectancy, 
immunization DPT., DALE) 
.82 .91 .97  .95  .98 .97 
 
 
Tables 9 and 12 show that, on average, developing nations score between .85 and .95 in 
output efficiency in the multiple input-output framework. This figures imply that 
developing countries could raise their output levels by an average of 10 percent with the 
same input consumption, if they were as efficient as the comparable benchmark 
countries.  This figure is simply indicative, as the precise estimate varies with the country 
and with the selected indicator, and has a large variance across countries: for instance, the 
bottom decile of (output) efficiency scores is about .66, implying that the scope for 
increasing health and education attainment levels is between 3 or 4 times higher than for 
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III.4. Efficiency Change Over Time 
 
To examine the evolution of input and output efficiency over time, we computed the 
efficiency scores in two different time periods: 1975-1980 and 1996-2002 for education 
study, and 1997-99 and 2000-02 for health study, the construction of which is driven by 
data availability. Appendix D reports the results on a regional basis
14. 
 
Comparison of different input-output bundles in different time periods has to be done 
carefully because the frontier can be shifting outward through time. In some cases the 
frontier displacement can be parallel (such as in the life expectancy case of Figure 9). In 
others, the frontier displacement can be very uneven (biased frontier shift in Figure 9) 
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Figure 9. Efficiency Frontier Shift Over Time 
 
The detailed comparison between observed input-output combinations in different time 
periods distinguishes whether variations in the levels of input utilization or output 
production levels are due to changes in efficiency or changes in technology.  This testing 
is possible with observed levels of inputs and outputs, and are based on the concept of a  
Malmquist Index (Fare, Grosskpof, Norris and Zhang, 1994). This method has been used 
to study productivity change in the OECD economies, as well as productivity in 
agriculture across the world (Coelli and Rao, 2003;  Nin, Arndt, and Preckel, 2003). 
Appendix D describes details of the method that uses some of the efficiency scores 
calculated in previous sections, and the index that will facilitate the analysis of 
productivity change through time. 
  
                                                 
14 Scores for individual countries are available at the PRMED website indicated in footnote 1.   25
Results show that over the two decades output-efficiency growth was faster in the most 
inefficient countries, showing that there is a “catching-up” phenomenon. However, when 
measuring input-efficiency, the previous results do not hold: most regions increased 
expenditure levels without increasing output. Appendix D summarizes, on a regional 




IV.  Explaining Inefficiency Variation Across Countries 
 
This chapter seeks to identify factors correlated with inefficiency scores variation across 
countries. This two-stage approach attempts to identify statistically significant 
regularities common to efficient or inefficient countries using the more basic statistical 
techniques. This exercise does not try to identify supply or demand factors that affect 
health and education outcomes, such as those described by Filmer (2003).  The scope is 
limited to verifying statistical association between the efficiency scores and 
environmental variables. 
 
IV.1. Method, Variables and Data Description 
 
Given that the dependent variable, the efficiency scores, is continuous and distributed 
over a limited interval (between zero and one), it is appropriate to use a censored (Tobit) 
regression model to analyze the relationships with other variables.  The panel consist of  a 
large numebr of countries (varying from 70 to 140  depending on the output indicator) 
and  only two time periods. The literature on panel estimation has shown that in panels 
with this configuration, that is, a large number of cross-section units (countries) and a 
relatively short time dimension (2 periods), the fixed-effects estimators of the coefficients  
will be inconsistent (Maddala, 1987) and their variance will be biased downward 
(Greene, 2003b). Hence the random effects panel estimation method was preferred. 
 
The dependent variable in the Tobit panel is the input efficiency score calculated by DEA 
method in the first stage. The input-oriented estimator reflects the consideration that input 
choices are more under the policymaker’s control. The independent variables reflect 
environmental effects included in precursor papers, as well as suggested by others 
recently.  We included the following independent variables
16.   
 
a. The size of government expenditure. Most of the papers surveyed in the previous 
section explore the relationship between the size of the government (or expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP) and efficiency levels.  The objective is to verify if additional pubic 
spending is associated with better education and health outcomes.  While some papers 
have found a negative association between efficiency and expenditure levels (Gupta-
Verhoeven 2001, Jarasuriya-Woodon 2003, and Afonso et.al. 2003), others have found a 
positive association (Evans et.al. 2003) and others have found no significant impact 
(Filmer and Pritchett, 1999) 
 
                                                 
15 The results on country-by-country basis can be found at the PRMED website indicated in footnote 1. 
16 The precise definition and sources is can be found in Appendix B, Table B.6.   26
b. A government budget composition variable.  Given that both education and health 
are labor-intensive activities, the government’s labor policies will determine the 
efficiency with which outputs are delivered.  We choose a budget composition indicator 
to reflect this, in particular, the ratio of the wage bill to the total budget.  A higher ratio is 
expected to be negatively correlated with efficiency. 
 
c.  Per-capita GDP. We included the per-capita GDP to control for the Balassa-
Samuleson effect in comparing across countries.  If richer countries tend to be more 
inefficient (given higher wages in these countries), a negative sign is expected.     
However, it must be recalled that to obtain the efficiency scores in the “fist stage” we 
constructed an auxiliary variable (the orthogonalized public expenditure). Hence the 
inclusion of this variable in the second stage is an attempt to control for any remaining 
Balassa- Samuleson effects. 
 
d.  Urbanization. The clustering of agents make it cheaper to provide services in 
urbanized areas rather than in rural.  Higher degree of urbanization should reflect in 
higher efficiency, making positive as the expected sign of the coefficient on this variable. 
 
e. Prevalence of AIDS. Based on WHO mappings of the disease, we included a dummy 
variable in the most severely affected countries to control for the role of this epidemic in 
the poor health outcomes.  Evans et. al. (2000) report that AIDS lowers the Disability 
adjusted life expectancy (DALE) by 15 years or more.  Aids also affects education 
outcomes both directly and indirectly (Drake, et. al. 2003): directly because school-age 
children are affected: UNAIDS estimates that almost 4 million children have been 
infected since the epidemic began, and two thirds have died. However, the indirect 
channel is relatively more important: AIDS leaves orphaned children that are more likely 
to drop-out of school or repeat. All these factors reflect how AIDS affect the demand for 
education.  But the supply is also affected by the decreasing teacher labor force due to 
illness or death, or the need to care for family (Pigozzi, 2004). Prevalence of HIV/AIDS 
should be negatively associated with education and health outcomes.  Consequently, 
efficiency scores should be negatively associated with the dummy variable.  
 
f.  Income distribution inequality. Ravallion (2003) argues that, besides the mean 
income, its distribution affects social indicators because their attainment is mostly 
determined by the income of the poor.  Hence, we controlled for the distribution of 
income by including the Gini coefficient as an explanatory variable.  Higher inequality is 
expected to be associated with lower educational and health attainments, making negative 
the expected sign of this variable.  
 
 g. Share of public sector in the provision of service.  Services can be provided by both 
the public and private sectors, and efficiency indicators will differ across countries 
depending on the relative productivities of both sectors. Previous studies have included 
this variable to explain differences in outcomes (Le Grand, 1987; Berger and Messer, 
2002) or efficiency scores (Greene, 2003a). The specific variable we included was the 
ratio of publicly financed service over the total spending (sum of private and public 
spending).   27
 
h. External Aid. To the extent that countries do not have to incur the burden of taxation, 
they may not have the incentive to use resources in the most cost-effective way.   Another 
channel through which aid-financing may affect efficiency is through the volatility and 
unpredictability of its flows.  Given that this financing source is more volatile than other 
types of fiscal revenue (Bulir and Hamann, 2000), it is difficult to undertake medium-
term planning with in activities funded with aid resources. If this is the case, we would 
expect a negative association between aid-dependence and efficiency in those activities 
funded with aid, mostly health services. To our knowledge there are no previous attempts 
to establish a relationship between efficiency and the degree to which activities are 
financed by external aid.  There is, however, recent evidence of a negative association 
between donor financing and some health outcomes (Bokhari, Gottret, and Gai, 2005) 
 
i.  Institutional Variables.  Countries with better institutions, more transparency, and less 
corruption are expected to have higher efficiency scores. Similarly, countries that have suffered 
wars or state failures are expected to register lower efficiency scores.  To capture these effects we 
included different indicators: the ICRG International Country Risk Indicators, the Worldwide 
Governance Research Indicators, in particular the Control of Corruption component (Kaufmann, 
et.al, 2002).  We also included a dummy variable if there had been some type of state failure, 
such as internal wars, from the State Failure Task force database. 
 
The data on educational and health indicators are not available on a continuous annual basis for 
many countries. Thus, averages of the variables were computed over sub-periods both in the first 
stage calculation of efficiency score and in the second stage of regression analysis. Specifically, 
educational indicators are averaged over two periods (1975-80 and 1996-2002) and health 
indicators over two periods (1996-99 and 2000-02). This discrepancy in the sub-period 
construction is due exclusively to the lack of data for earlier years. The averages are treated as 
separate observations. The advantages of this approach are threefold. First, the averages may 
serve as a better measure of the educational and health attainment, which can hardly be 
substantially improved on a yearly basis; Second, the averaging maximizes the coverage of 
countries for each period, since one observation of a certain year is sufficient to help the country 
survive in the cross sectional comparison; Third, the time series thus constructed for each 
country, although short, facilitates the implementation of econometric techniques on panel data to 
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IV.2.  Results 
 
 The Tobit estimation on panel data is defined as follows. 
 
) , , , , , ,                        
, , , (
CONS INST EXTAID GINI AIDS URBAN GDPPC
PUBTOT GOVEXP WAGE f VRSTE
it it it it it it
it it it it =
 
where    it VRSTE     = Variable returns to scale DEA efficiency score for single output 
and multiple output cases. 
  it WAGE      = Wages and salaries (% of total public expenditure) 
  it GOVEXP  = Total government expenditure (% of GDP) 
  it PUBTOT  = Share of expenditures publicly financed (public/total) 
  it GDPPC    = GDP per capita in constant 1995 US dollars 
it URBAN    = Urban population (% of total) 
it AIDS        = Dummy variable for HIV/AIDS 
it GINI         = Gini Coefficient 
it EXTAID   = External aid (% of fiscal revenue) 
it INST         = Institutional indicators including ICRG country risk, World            
Governance Research Indicators (Corruption Control), or a dummy for state 
failures from the State Failure Task Force database. 
CONS         = Constant 
 
 
Tables 13 and 14 report the results for the single-input single-output case  and the 
multiple-input multiple-output  case, respectively. The more interesting findings are: 
 
 
a.  We find that countries with larger expenditure levels also register the more 
inefficient scores.  This result is robust to changes in the output indicator selected,  
to considering health or education, and to adopting either the single –output or 
multiple output frameworks. The trade-off between size of expenditure and 
efficiency is quite robust. 
 
b.   Countries in which the wage bill represents a higher fraction of total expenditure 
tend to be more inefficient.  This result does not hold for health in the multiple 
output framework. This difference could be due partly to the relatively decreasing 
number of health care professionals in the world, especially in the poorer 
countries (Liese, et.al., 2003).  Further investigation would be required to examine 
why this is not the case in education. 
 
c.  Countries in which public financing is a larger share of total expenditure on the 
service also register lower efficiency scores.  This is probably due to differential 
productivity rates in the provision of services. Further research would be needed 
to explain why this is the case in health services.    Recent case studies of water   29
companies in Argentina show that private companies were more efficient than 
public ones and provided better service quality leading to lower child mortality 
rates (Galiani, Gertler and Schargrodsky, 2005). In education, there is some 
evidence that efficiency scores are lower in public schools (Alexander and 
Jaforullah, 2004), though the evidence regarding the impact of privatizing 
education on outcomes is mixed (World Bank, 2003). 
 
d.   Urbanization is positively associated with efficiency scores in both education and 
health.  However, when life expectancy is included as an output, the relationship 
is non-significant (single output) or negative (multiple-output).  Possibly the 
urbanization variable is capturing other effects such as crime.  There is ample 
literature studying the relationship between urbanization and crime (Glaeser E. 
and B. Sacerdote, 1999).  Alternatively, as urbanization intensifies, communicable 
diseases are more difficult and costly to control, hence the negative association 
found between both variables in health. 
e.  The effect of the HIV/AIDS is clearly negative affecting health efficiency scores 
in the multiple-output models. However, its effect on education is less clear, as 
the expected negative sign is significant in few cases and has the opposite sign in 
equal number of cases. This confirms the difficulty of empirically verifying this 
relationship, reported in previous work (Wobst and Arndt, 2003). 
 
f.  Income distribution has the expected negative effect on the educational and health 
efficiency scores.  The impact of inequality on health scores is less robust than in 
education, but confirms Greene’s findings (2003).  Other papers (Berger and 
Messer, 2002), have found a positive association between income inequality and 
health outcomes.  
 
g.  Results showed a negative relationship between some of the efficiency scores and 
the external aid dependency ratio. Only in one of the multiple-output cases is the 
external aid associated with higher efficiency, but with border-line statistical 
significance.  Though no causality relationship can be inferred from the exercise, 
this is one of the results that merit more detailed research. This result might be 
explained by the volatility of aid as a funding source that limits medium term 
planning and effective budgeting. Probably this is why the negative sign is more 
robust in health than in education, given that donor funding is mostly directed 
towards the first. Recent research (Bokhari, Gottret, Gai, 2005) show a negative 
association between some health outcomes and the degree of donor funding, 
pointing in this same direction.  This result also coincides with research showing 
that the quality of policies is not only unrelated to donor financing, but that highly 
indebted countries with “bad” policies received more net transfers as a share of 
GDP (Birdsall, et.al. 2003). 
 
h.  None of the institutional variables proved to be statistically significant.  We 
interpret this result as due to the data limitations, as some of the most crucial 
information, for instance the corruption index is only available since 1996 and the 
panel exercise was limited to a cross-section.  The state-failure dummy variable or   30
the ICRG indicators did not prove to be significant either.  Hence, these results 
are not reported in any of the tables. 
 
To investigate the possibility of slope heterogeneity across countries, we followed the 
approach used in Haque, Pesaran, and Sharma (1999). Specifically, the slope coefficients 
in each country are assumed to be fixed over time, but varying across countries linearly 
with the individual sample mean of GDP per capita. The final results (Tables 15 and 16) 
only include the statistically significant interaction terms, in order to avoid co linearity 
arising from the correlation between original explanatory variables and the auxiliary 
variable capturing the interaction of these with the sample mean of GDP per capita.   
Hence the estimated model is: 
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where    it VRSTE     = Variable returns to scale DEA efficiency score for single output and 
multiple output cases 
  it WAGE      = Wages and salaries (% of total public expenditure) 
  it GOVEXP  = Total government expenditure (% of GDP) 
it PUBTOT  = Share of expenditures publicly financed (public/total) 
  it GDPPC    = GDP per capita in constant 1995 US dollars 
it URBAN    = Urban population (% of total) 
it AIDS        = Dummy variable for HIV/AIDS 
it GINI         = Gini Coefficient 
CONS         = Constant 
it WAGEG    =  i it GDPPC WAGE *  
it GOVG      =  i it GDPPC GOVEXP *  
it GINIG      =  i it GDPPC GINI *  
i GDPPC    =  ∑ =
− T





Results show that the interaction terms are significant, especially for the health 
regression, implying that there is a heterogeneous response of efficiency scores to the 
different explanatory variables.  This confirms Greene’s (2003) results on the WHO data.  
One of the key results of this section is that the negative association between the size of 
government expenditure and efficiency is stronger in countries with higher per-capita 
GDP.  Similarly, this happens with the wage variable.  Results are somewhat similar to 
those of the homogeneous slopes, though statistical significance of many of the 
coefficients is lower.  This is the result of co-linearity between the auxiliary variables and 
the original set of explanatory variables.  This problem deserves further work in the 
future. 
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Interpretation of these results requires caution due to several limitations.  First, education 
and health outcomes are explained by multiple supply and demand factors (Filmer, 2003) 
that are not included here.  This is not the object of the present paper. The omission of 
one of these factors in the health or education production functions in the previous stage 
could explain some of the cross-country co-variation of the efficiency results (Ravallion, 
2003).  The goodness-of-fit analysis of the first stage indicated that no important factor 
seemed to be omitted.  Of course, there can always be additional factors that could be 
included but the curse of dimensionality
17 is particularly pressing in non-parametric 
statistical methods (even if the data were available)  
 
The second limitation derives from the intuitive question why the set of explanatory 
variables used in the second stage were not included in the first stage.  The answer lies in 
that most of these variables are environmental and outside the control of the decision-
making unit.  The inclusion of these environmental variables would have had little 
justification from the production function perspective. Additionally, by maintaining the 
production function as simple as possible the dimensionality curse is avoided.   
 
Finally, the third limitation arises from the fact that if the variables used in the first stage 
to obtain the efficiency estimator are correlated with the second stage explanatory 
variables, the coefficients will be inconsistent and biased (Simar and Wilson, 2004; 
Grosskopf, 1996; Ravallion, 2003). To examine the extent of this potential problem we 
calculated correlation coefficients between the “first-stage” inputs and the second stage 
explanatory variables. The largest correlation coefficients were between GDP per capita 
and the teachers per pupil ratio and the literacy of the adult.  To examine the sensitivity of 
the results to the inclusion of GDP per capita, all the estimations were performed without 
this variable and none of the results changed. 
 
V.  Concluding Remarks and Directions for Future Work 
 
 
The paper presented an application of non-parametric methods to analyze the efficiency 
of public spending.  Based on a sample of more than 140 countries, the paper estimated 
efficiency scores for nine education output indicators and fourth health output indicators.  
Our results indicate that countries could achieve substantially higher education and health 
output levels: on average, developing countries score output efficiency of about .9 (in the 
multiple input-output framework) or around .7 (in the single input-single output model), 
implying that they could increase health and education attainment between by 10 percent 
or 30 percent while consuming the same input level, if they were as efficient as the 
comparable benchmark countries.  This is just an indicative figure, as the figures vary 
across countries and with the selected output indicator. It is crucial to identify what are 
the institutional or economic factors that cause some countries to be more efficient than 
others in the service delivery. 
 
                                                 
17  As the number of outputs increase, the number of observations must increase exponentially to maintain a 
given mean-square error of the estimator.  See Simar and Wilson (2000).   32
In terms of policy implications, it is vital to differentiate between the technically efficient 
level and the optimal or desired spending level. Even if a country is identified as an 
“efficient” benchmark country, it may very well still need to expand its public spending 
levels to achieve a target level of educational or health attainment indicators. Such is the 
case of countries with low spending levels and low attainment indicators, close to the 
origin of the efficient frontier..  The important thing is that countries expand their scale of 
operation along the efficient frontier. 
 
The methods used in the paper can be interpreted as tools to identify extreme cases of 
efficient units and inefficient cases. Once the cases have been identified, more in-depth 
analysis is required to explain departures from the benchmark, as proposed and done by 
Sen (1981).  Given that the methods are based on estimating the frontier directly from 
observed input-output combinations they are subject to sampling variability and are 
sensitive to the presence of outliers.  Recent advances allow dealing with these problems 
such as in Wilson (2004).  Additionally, it would be useful to contrast these results with 
those obtained with the use of parametric stochastic frontier estimation. 
 
In a “second stage” the paper verified statistical association between the efficiency scores 
and environmental variables that are not under the control of the decision-making units.  
The panel Tobit regressions showed that the variables, which are negatively associated 
with efficiency scores, include the size of public expenditure, the share of the wage bill in 
the total public budget, the proportion of the service that is publicly financed, the 
prevalence of HIV/AIDS epidemic on health efficiency scores, income inequality on 
education efficiency scores, and external aid-financing on some of the efficiency scores.  
This last impact is probably due to the volatility of aid that impedes effective medium 
term planning and budgeting, and probably explains why the result is more robust in 
health than in education where most of the donor-funding is directed. This result point in 
the same direction of previous research showing that donor financing is unrelated to the 
quality of domestic policies and that, in the case of highly indebted counties, those with 
worse policies received more transfers.  A positive association between urbanization and 
efficiency outcomes is also identified in education but some of the health efficiency 
scores are negatively associated. This last result probably is due to higher crime rates in 
the cities or the effect of communicable diseases that spread with agglomeration.  These 
are topics for further research in case studies. 
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WAGE  -.00117***  -.00357* -.00172**  -.00680* -.00189** -.00570*  -.00470**  -.00546*  .00065  -.00052  -.00049 
GOVEXP  -.00387* -.00546* -.00340* -.00455**  -.00387*  -.00696*  -.00566*  -.00765*  -.00269**  -.00078  -.00227*** 
PUBTOT  -- -- -- -- --  --  --  --  -.00213*  -.00150*  -.00135*** 
GDPPC  -.00002* -.00002* -.00001* .00002** -.00002*  -1.5e-6  -.00001 -7.7e-6  7.6e-7  -.00001* -.00001* 
URBAN .00167*  .00143***  .00168*  .00037  .00187*  .00532*  .00551*  .00555*  -.00018  .00099**  .00088 
AIDS  -.04471** -.08731** -.02204  .01243  -.02974  .12717***  .1211***  .11041  -.05473  -.01108  -.02730 
GINI  -.06688 .01507  -.19326**  -.42311 -.18484***  -.44658**  -.34402  -.45870**  .22118  .09510 .08692 
EXTAID  -.00094 -.00196**  -.00021 -.00106 -.00054  .00089 -.00025  -.00006  -.00224***  -.00155 -.00324** 
CONS  1.02996*  1.1282* 1.0472* .84138* 1.0697*  .76791*  .70009*  .81705*  .79193* .78734* .84384* 
# of Obs 
















































Note: * 0.01 significance level, ** 0.05 significance level, *** 0.10 significance level, and insignificant otherwise   34
Table 14. Explaining cross-country variation in efficiency, Multiple Inputs-Multiple Outputs 
Independent 
Variable 
EDU2-2 EDU2-2n  EDU3-2  EDU3-2n EDU3-3  EDU3-3bl  HEA2-2 HEA3-2  HEA3-2m  HEA3-3 
WAGE -.00212**  -.00767*  -.00219**  -.00425  -.001000  -.00340***  .00126*  .00205*  .00203***  .00203*** 
GOVEXP -.00321*  -.00365  -.00203***  .00099 -.00123***  -.00316***  -.0012***  -.00273*  -.0009 -.00090 
PUBTOT --  --  --  --  --  --  -.00151*  -.00142*  -.00159***  -.00151*** 
GDPPC -.00001**  -6.6e-7  -.00001***  -.00003  -4.2e-6  1.98e-6  -2.7e-6  4.2e-6*  -7.1e-7  -9.3e-7 
URBAN .00138***  -.00045  .00191**  .001997  .00127*  .00091  -.00095*  -.00148*  -.00106  -.00105 
AIDS -.03295  -.05843  -.00956  -.14763  .01797  .06022  -.04815*  -.033147**  -.07162  -.06999 
GINI -.06485  .43602  -.14717  .27058  -.17237**  -.15697  -.03997  -.07958***  -.01015  -.01387 
EXTAID .00010  -.00622 .00152  -.00274  -.00066  .00123  .00087  .00128***  -.00095  -.00106 
CONS 1.0655*  1.0223  1.0642*  1.0124*  1.06570*  1.1218*  1.0098  1.0117*  .98891*  .98787* 
# of Obs 













































* 0.01 significance level, ** 0.05 significance level, *** 0.10 significance level, and insignificant otherwise 
EDU2-2: Inputs: orthogonalized public spending on education per capita, teachers per pupil 
    Outputs: gross primary and secondary enrollments 
  EDU2-2n: same inputs as EDU2-2, outputs: net primary and secondary enrollment 
  EDU3-2: literacy of adult is added to EDU2-2 as input 
  EDU3-2n: literacy of adult is added to EDU2-2n as input 
  EDU3-3: literacy of youth is added to EDU3-2 as output 
  EDU3-3bl: same inputs as in EDU3-2,  
outputs: average years of school, first level complete, and second level complete (Barro-Lee education indicators) 
  HEA2-2: Inputs: orthogonalized public spending on health per capita, literacy of adult 
        Outputs: life expectancy at birth, and immunization DPT 
  HEA3-2: orthogonalized private spending on health per capita is added to HEA2-2 as input 
  HEA3-2m: Immunization Measles is in place of DPT in HEA3-2 as output 
  HEA3-3: Immunization Measles is added to HEA3-2 as output   35



































WAGE  -.00006 .00076  -.00035 -.00228 -.00056  -.00200 -.00120  -.00419  -.00306***  -.00079 -.00241 
GOVEXP  -.00363*  -.00255*** -.00377*  -.00727*** -.00552*  -.00595*** -.00453  -.00611***  .00337**  .00168*** .00221 
PUBTOT  -- -- -- -- --  -- --  --  -.00162*  -.00162*  -.00097 
GDPPC  -.00002* -.00002* -5.4e-6  .00003*  -.00002***  .00004*  .00003***  .00003*** .00002**  -.00002* -.00001 
URBAN .00179*  .00132**  .00193*  .00139  .00212*  .00566*  .00601*  .00593*  -.00080  -.00117*  .00021 
AIDS -.03866***  -.06603**  -.03153  .01010  -.02177  .05491  .06656  .06464  -.02321  -.04147**  -.00826 
GINI  -.14230 -.42098*  -.14976 -.29395 -.13107  -.09995 -.15463  -.24762  -.12865 -.38851*  -.42162** 
WAGG -4.4e-6***  -1.2e-6*  -4.6e-7***  -9.4e-7  -4.5e-7  -8.1e-7  -8.8e-7  -2.4e-7  8.9e-7**  6.95e-8  5.1e-7 
GOVG -8.6e-8  -5.2e-7***  4.3e-8  3.6e-7  4.0e-7  -4.3e-7  -4.4e-7  -5.3e-7  -1.4e-6*  -5.4e-7*  -9.4e-7* 
GINIG .00003  .00011*  -2.4e-6  -.00003  2.0e-6  -.00006  -.00005  -.00006  .00001  .00009*  .00006*** 
CONS  1.0156* 1.1036* 1.0098* .74603* 1.0365*  .60371* .53977*  .68648*  .82665* 1.0119* .93820* 
# of Obs 
















































Note: * 0.01 significance level, ** 0.05 significance level, *** 0.10 significance level, and insignificant otherwise   36
Table 16. Explaining cross-country variation in efficiency, Multiple Inputs and Multiple Outputs - Heterogeneous Slopes 
Independent 
Variable 
EDU2-2 EDU2-2n  EDU3-2  EDU3-2n EDU3-3  EDU3-3bl  HEA2-2 HEA3-2  HEA3-2m  HEA3-3 
WAGE .00051  -.00140  .00005  .00494  -.00018  -.00045  -.00063  -.00065  -.00093  -.00092 
GOVEXP -.00323**  .00501  -.00385**  .00520 -.00256**  -.00459  .00122***  .00063 -.00070  -.00064 
PUBTOT --  --  --  --  --  --  -.00180*  -.00145**  -.00149***  -.00141*** 
GDPPC -8.6e-6  .00002  1.7e-6  .00003  -1.8e-6  -2.1e-6  -.00001**  -.00001  -.00003**  -.00003** 
URBAN .00137**  .00079 .00166**  .00096  .00134*  .00064  -.00246*  -.00167***  -.00160  -.00159 
AIDS -.04139  -.06211  -.04744  -.20362*  .00646  .04633  -.06289*  -.04001  -.07217  -.07025 
GINI -.14418  -.18676  .07096  -.02601  -.07474  -.20029  -.32844*  -.45695**  -.29885  -.30857 
WAGG -8.3e-7**  -1.2e-6  -6.4e-7***  -1.9e-6  -2.0e-7  -7.9e-7  7.8e-7*  7.2e-7  6.0e-7  6.0e-7 
GOVG -6.3e-8  -2.6e-6***  3.5e-7  -1.2e-6  3.0e-7  3.5e-7  -5.98e-7*  -4.9e-7  2.7e-8  1.4e-8 
GINIG .00003  .00012  -.00003  .00005  -.00002  .00003  .00005*  .00005***  .00006  .00006*** 
CONS 1.0515*  .89986*  1.0021*  .84756*  1.0464  1.1257*  1.1494*  1.1457*  1.1512*  1.1495* 
# of Obs 













































1.  * 0.01 significance level, ** 0.05 significance level, *** 0.10 significance level, and insignificant otherwise 
2.  EDU2-2: Inputs: orthogonalized public spending on education per capita, teachers per pupil 
    Outputs: gross primary and secondary enrollments 
  EDU2-2n: same inputs as EDU2-2, outputs: net primary and secondary enrollment 
  EDU3-2: literacy of adult is added to EDU2-2 as input 
  EDU3-2n: literacy of adult is added to EDU2-2n as input 
  EDU3-3: literacy of youth is added to EDU3-2 as output 
  EDU3-3bl: same inputs as in EDU3-2,  
outputs: average years of school, first level complete, and second level complete (Barro-Lee education indicators) 
  HEA2-2: Inputs: orthogonalized public spending on health per capita, literacy of adult 
        Outputs: life expectancy at birth, and immunization DPT 
  HEA3-2: orthogonalized private spending on health per capita is added to HEA2-2 as input 
  HEA3-2m: Immunization Measles is in place of DPT in HEA3-2 as output 
  HEA3-3: Immunization Measles is added to HEA3-2 as output  37
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Appendix A. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) Model 
 
A measure of production efficiency, perhaps the simplest one, is defined as the ratio of 
output to input. It is, however, inadequate to deal with the existence of multiple inputs 
and outputs. The relative efficiency for all decision-making units (DMU), j=1,…,n, is 
then modified as the ratio of weighted outputs to weighted inputs, more precisely,  












1     (A.1) 
where x and y are inputs and outputs, respectively, and u and v are the common weights 
assigned to outputs and inputs, respectively. A challenge of this measure immediately 
follows: it is difficult to justify the common weights given that DMUs may value inputs 
and outputs differently.  
 
The seminal paper by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) proposed the following ratio 
form to allow for difference in weights across DMUs, which establishes the foundation of 
data envelopment analysis (DEA). 
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L     (A.2) 
 
In the model, there are j=1,…, n observed DMUs which employ i =1,…, m inputs to 
produce r =1,…, s outputs. One DMU is singled out each time, designated as DMU0, to 
be evaluated against the observed performance of all DMUs. The objective of model 
(A.2) is to find the most favorable weights,  i r ν   and   μ , for DMU0 to maximize the relative 
efficiency. The constraints are that the same weights will make ratio for every DMU be 
less than or equal to unity. The optimal value of the ratio must be  1 0
*
0 ≤ ≤ h  and DMU0 
is efficient if and only  1
*
0 = h , otherwise it is considered as relatively inefficient. One 
problem with the ratio formulation is that there are an infinite number of solutions: if 
i r ν   and   μ are solutions to (A.2), so are  0    ,   and   > ∀α α αμ i r ν . 
 
It is worth observing one important feature of model (A.2). In maximizing the objective 
function it is the relative magnitude of the numerator and the denominator that really 
matters and not their individual values. It is thus equivalent to setting the denominator to 
a constant, say 1, and maximizing the numerator. This transformation will not only lead   41
to the uniqueness of solution but also convert the fractional formulation of model (A.2) 
into a linear programming problem in model (A.3). 
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Model (A.3) facilitates straightforward interpretation in terms economics. The objective 
is now to maximize the weighted output per unit weighted input under various conditions, 
the most critical one of which is that the virtual output does not exceed the virtual input 
for any DMU.  
 
Since model (A.3) is a linear programming, we can convert the maximization problem 
into a minimization problem, e.g. a dual problem, by assigning a dual variable to each 
constraint in the primal (A.3). Specifically, dual variables 
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A dual minimization problem is thus derived as model (A.4). It is clear that model (A.4) 
has m+s constraints while model (A.3) has n+m+s+1 constraints. Since n is usually 
considerably larger than m+s, the dual DEA significantly reduces the computational 
burden and is easier to solve than the primal.   42
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More importantly, the duality theorem of linear programming states that the solution 
value to the objective function in (A.4) is exactly equal to that in (A.3). And, the dual 
variables, ) , , , ( 2 1 n λ λ λ L , have the interpretation of Lagrange multipliers. That is, the 
value of a dual variable is equal to the shadow price of Lagrange Multiplier. It is also 
known that, from constrained optimization problem,  0 > j λ  normally when the constraint 
in (A.3’) is binding and  0 = j λ  if not. Note that the binding constraint in (A.3) implies 
that the corresponding DMU is efficient. In another word, efficient units are identified by 
positive  s ' λ  while inefficient units are given  s ' λ of zero. The DMU in question in model 
(A.4) is thus compared with the efficient DMUs only, named as comparison peers in the 
literature. The solution values of  s ' λ reflect the exact weights assigned to each peer in the 
evaluation of DMU0.  
 
Since only efficient DMUs exert effective constraints in model (A.4), as argued above, 
the input-output bundle,  )   , (




j j ij y λ x λ , is the most efficient combination for 
,m , i L 1 =  and  s r , , 1L = . To achieve an output level  0 r y , which is as close as possible 
to  ∑ =
n
j j rj y λ , DMU0 has to use an input bundle to meet the minimum requirement, 
∑ =
n
j j ijλ x
1 . This further implies that the solution 
* θ  is the lowest proportion of the 
current input bundle,  0 i x  used by DMU0 , that is actually required to meet the minimum 
input requirement and produce target output  0 r y . The solution 
* θ  is defined as the 
efficiency score for DMU0.  For instance,  60 . 0
* = θ  implies that 40 percent of current 
input is a waste of resources. 
 
Model (A.4) also offers the explanation why the data envelopment analysis is so named. 
The first constraint in (A.4) defines a lower limit of inputs and the second constraint an 
upper limit of outputs for DMU0, and within the limits θ  is minimized. The set of 
solutions to all DMUs forms an upper bound that envelops all observations.   43
Appendix B. 
Table B.1 Efficiency Score for Selected Education Indicators 
  Primary School Enrollment  Secondary School Enrollment 
 Input  Efficiency Output  Efficiency Input  Efficiency Output  Efficiency 
Country  FDH  DEA  FDH DEA FDH DEA FDH DEA 
AGO  0.702  0.702  0.502 0.490 0.702 0.702 0.157 0.132 
ARG  0.813  0.761  0.838 0.838 0.726 0.651 0.922 0.711 
ARM  0.707  0.707  0.703 0.690 0.707 0.707 0.883 0.746 
AZE  0.709  0.690  0.729 0.695 0.682 0.682 0.793 0.650 
BDI 0.665  0.665  0.410 0.410 0.665 0.665 0.087 0.070 
BEN  0.678  0.678  0.668 0.635 0.678 0.678 0.217 0.177 
BFA  0.700  0.700  0.324 0.315 0.700 0.700 0.098 0.082 
BGD  0.727  0.702  0.722 0.702 0.699 0.699 0.404 0.338 
BGR  0.883  0.807  0.857 0.809 0.769 0.769 0.932 0.809 
BHR  0.999  0.907  0.915 0.901 0.999 0.941 0.998 0.954 
BHS  1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
BLR  0.692  0.663  0.766 0.766 0.603 0.603 0.667 0.667 
BLZ 0.747  0.707  0.846 0.846 0.581 0.581 0.496 0.496 
BOL  0.732  0.712  0.794 0.794 0.626 0.626 0.549 0.549 
BRA  1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 0.779 0.709 0.932 0.761 
BRB  0.460  0.433  0.752 0.752 0.636 0.472 0.786 0.786 
BWA  0.494  0.463  0.747 0.747 0.430 0.430 0.551 0.551 
CAF  0.697  0.697  0.500 0.485 0.697 0.697 0.097 0.081 
CHL  0.842  0.776  0.866 0.782 0.733 0.733 0.813 0.707 
CHN  1.000  0.949  1.000 0.953 0.778 0.778 0.693 0.607 
CIV 0.656  0.656  0.538 0.538 0.656 0.656 0.234 0.186 
CMR  0.699  0.699  0.708 0.689 0.699 0.699 0.284 0.238 
COG  0.715  0.715  0.607 0.601 0.715 0.715 0.423 0.361 
COL  0.768  0.754  0.801 0.801 0.657 0.657 0.692 0.550 
COM  0.668  0.668  0.585 0.585 0.668 0.668 0.251 0.202 
CPV  0.910  0.902  0.942 0.942 0.659 0.659 0.620 0.495 
CRI 0.703  0.670  0.761 0.761 0.612 0.612 0.426 0.426 
CZE 0.719  0.670  0.743 0.743 0.626 0.626 0.680 0.680 
DJI  0.680  0.680  0.292 0.278 0.680 0.680 0.170 0.139 
DMA  0.561  0.556  0.710 0.710 0.620 0.550 0.702 0.702 
DOM  1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 0.856 0.856 0.609 0.574 
DZA  0.723  0.698  0.772 0.772 0.629 0.629 0.519 0.519 
ERI 0.671  0.671  0.404 0.404 0.671 0.671 0.251 0.203 
EST 0.478  0.476  0.717 0.717 0.731 0.586 0.835 0.835 
ETH  0.661  0.661  0.383 0.383 0.661 0.661 0.156 0.125 
FJI  0.741  0.690  0.835 0.835 0.577 0.577 0.596 0.596 
GAB  1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 0.724 0.724 0.487 0.419 
GEO  0.711  0.711  0.708 0.697 0.711 0.711 0.763 0.647 
GHA  0.666  0.666  0.564 0.564 0.666 0.666 0.363 0.292 
GIN 0.726  0.726  0.507 0.469 0.726 0.726 0.136 0.118 
GMB  0.677  0.677  0.566 0.566 0.677 0.677 0.320 0.261 
GNB  0.686  0.686  0.516 0.495 0.686 0.686 0.145 0.120   44
Table B.1 (continued) 
  Primary School Enrollment  Secondary School Enrollment 
 Input  Efficiency Output  Efficiency Input  Efficiency Output  Efficiency 
Country  FDH  DEA  FDH DEA FDH DEA FDH DEA 
GRD  0.651  0.651  0.678 0.678 0.651 0.651 0.633 0.500 
GTM  0.857  0.829  0.840 0.812 0.824 0.824 0.324 0.297 
GUY  0.758  0.740  0.796 0.796 0.649 0.649 0.826 0.650 
HND  0.762  0.731  0.767 0.767 0.663 0.663 0.323 0.259 
HRV  0.657  0.657  0.669 0.669 0.657 0.657 0.878 0.699 
HUN  0.696  0.642  0.735 0.735 0.826 0.681 0.757 0.757 
IDN 0.913  0.900  0.966 0.904 0.795 0.795 0.593 0.528 
IND 0.709  0.702  0.747 0.713 0.682 0.682 0.478 0.392 
IRN 0.625  0.625  0.677 0.677 0.625 0.625 0.634 0.634 
JAM  0.599  0.591  0.708 0.708 0.576 0.576 0.622 0.622 
JOR 0.583  0.583  0.679 0.679 0.583 0.583 0.613 0.613 
KAZ  0.708  0.687  0.726 0.692 0.681 0.681 0.894 0.733 
KEN  0.631  0.631  0.643 0.643 0.631 0.631 0.296 0.228 
KGZ  0.775  0.713  0.733 0.733 0.675 0.675 0.843 0.686 
KHM  0.827  0.809  0.824 0.821 0.720 0.720 0.212 0.182 
KNA  0.809  0.759  0.840 0.840 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
KOR  0.762  0.741  0.815 0.736 1.000 0.839 1.000 0.870 
KWT  0.406  0.406  0.645 0.645 0.406 0.406 0.666 0.666 
LAO  0.897  0.817  0.861 0.837 0.698 0.698 0.347 0.291 
LBN  0.880  0.840  0.900 0.846 0.766 0.766 0.840 0.726 
LCA  0.573  0.565  0.805 0.805 0.490 0.490 0.642 0.642 
LKA  0.852  0.835  0.926 0.845 0.742 0.742 0.808 0.681 
LSO 0.602  0.594  0.807 0.807 0.515 0.515 0.248 0.248 
LTU  0.710  0.647  0.725 0.725 0.710 0.654 0.722 0.722 
LVA  0.548  0.541  0.707 0.707 0.527 0.527 0.684 0.684 
MAC  1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 0.962 0.962 0.889 0.863 
MAR  0.628  0.628  0.679 0.679 0.628 0.628 0.304 0.304 
MDA  0.613  0.613  0.626 0.626 0.613 0.613 0.572 0.572 
MDG  0.708  0.697  0.742 0.707 0.680 0.680 0.152 0.124 
MEX  0.752  0.740  0.802 0.802 0.644 0.644 0.700 0.548 
MKD  0.766  0.694  0.722 0.722 0.667 0.667 0.798 0.643 
MLI 0.679  0.679  0.382 0.363 0.679 0.679 0.128 0.104 
MNG  0.655  0.634  0.688 0.688 0.630 0.630 0.647 0.497 
MOZ  0.682  0.682  0.629 0.601 0.682 0.682 0.108 0.088 
MRT  0.677  0.677  0.603 0.603 0.677 0.677 0.197 0.161 
MUS  0.792  0.759  0.806 0.776 0.690 0.690 0.738 0.611 
MWI  0.911  0.901  0.941 0.941 0.660 0.660 0.175 0.140 
MYS  0.530  0.523  0.707 0.707 0.509 0.509 0.526 0.526 
NAM  0.572  0.531  0.832 0.832 0.446 0.446 0.469 0.469 
NER  0.680  0.680  0.249 0.237 0.680 0.680 0.067 0.055 
NIC 0.773  0.712  0.734 0.734 0.673 0.673 0.526 0.427 
NPL 0.871  0.807  0.830 0.830 0.678 0.678 0.401 0.328 
OMN  0.742  0.742  0.692 0.632 0.742 0.742 0.763 0.643   45
Table B.1 (continued) 
  Primary School Enrollment  Secondary School Enrollment 
 Input  Efficiency Output  Efficiency Input  Efficiency Output  Efficiency 
Country  FDH  DEA  FDH DEA FDH DEA FDH DEA 
PAK  0.712  0.712  0.528 0.522 0.712 0.712 0.261 0.222 
PAN  0.701  0.678  0.774 0.774 0.610 0.610 0.527 0.527 
PER 1.000  0.919  1.000 0.926 0.727 0.727 0.775 0.670 
PHL 0.890  0.810  0.860 0.831 0.692 0.692 0.789 0.655 
PNG  0.732  0.732  0.654 0.590 0.732 0.732 0.205 0.178 
POL 0.554  0.549  0.710 0.710 0.727 0.608 0.766 0.766 
PRY  0.747  0.732  0.800 0.800 0.639 0.639 0.555 0.432 
ROM  0.821  0.758  0.774 0.767 0.715 0.715 0.806 0.687 
RUS  0.852  0.837  0.945 0.849 0.729 0.729 0.875 0.758 
RWA  0.800  0.792  0.851 0.815 0.685 0.685 0.130 0.107 
SAU  0.414  0.414  0.504 0.504 0.414 0.414 0.519 0.519 
SDN  0.616  0.616  0.398 0.398 0.616 0.616 0.220 0.220 
SEN 0.663  0.663  0.513 0.513 0.663 0.663 0.171 0.137 
SLB 0.708  0.690  0.731 0.696 0.680 0.680 0.181 0.148 
SLE 0.684  0.684  0.492 0.470 0.684 0.684 0.167 0.137 
SLV 0.902  0.858  0.930 0.861 0.785 0.785 0.518 0.457 
SVK  0.752  0.692  0.733 0.733 0.655 0.655 0.881 0.699 
SWZ  0.666  0.642  0.771 0.771 0.580 0.580 0.387 0.387 
SYR  0.792  0.748  0.794 0.764 0.690 0.690 0.428 0.354 
TCD  0.686  0.686  0.510 0.489 0.686 0.686 0.107 0.088 
TGO  0.901  0.834  0.885 0.885 0.653 0.653 0.328 0.259 
THA  0.605  0.605  0.667 0.667 0.605 0.605 0.513 0.513 
TJK 0.784  0.724  0.775 0.740 0.683 0.683 0.790 0.649 
TON  0.675  0.662  0.801 0.801 0.788 0.659 0.766 0.766 
TTO  0.810  0.743  0.769 0.753 0.705 0.705 0.785 0.662 
TUN  0.643  0.590  0.824 0.824 0.500 0.500 0.565 0.565 
TUR  0.746  0.725  0.728 0.723 0.717 0.717 0.677 0.579 
TZA  0.676  0.676  0.467 0.467 0.676 0.676 0.059 0.048 
UGA  0.949  0.869  0.921 0.886 0.690 0.690 0.129 0.107 
UKR  0.659  0.659  0.585 0.585 0.899 0.724 0.968 0.772 
URY  1.000  0.986  1.000 0.985 1.000 0.945 1.000 0.957 
UZB  0.612  0.612  0.655 0.655 0.835 0.678 0.748 0.748 
VCT  0.581  0.532  0.728 0.728 0.506 0.506 0.548 0.548 
VNM  0.813  0.794  0.823 0.808 0.708 0.708 0.638 0.540 
VUT  0.603  0.578  0.766 0.766 0.525 0.525 0.203 0.203 
WSM  0.675  0.671  0.716 0.716 0.649 0.649 0.729 0.574 
YEM  0.627  0.627  0.544 0.544 0.627 0.627 0.324 0.324 
ZAF 0.621  0.577  0.833 0.833 0.555 0.484 0.693 0.693 
ZMB  0.682  0.682  0.610 0.582 0.682 0.682 0.259 0.212 
ZWE  0.549  0.510  0.741 0.741 0.478 0.478 0.344 0.344 
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Table B.2. Efficiency Score for Selected Education Indicator - Learning scores  
–  Excluding Developed Countries 
 
  Learning  Input Efficiency Output  Efficiency  Learning Input Efficiency Output  Efficiency
Country  Score  FDH DEA FDH DEA Country  Score  FDH DEA  FDH DEA 
HUN  542  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 HND  396  0.294 0.294  0.731 0.731 
SVK  535  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 PER  392  0.525 0.525  0.742 0.733 
CZE  530  0.972 0.800 0.991 0.990 VUT  375  0.152 0.152  0.692 0.692 
RUS  528  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 KEN  349  0.232 0.232  0.644 0.644 
BGR  515  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 PHL  345  0.382 0.382  0.645 0.639 
MYS  506  0.169 0.169 0.934 0.934 MUS  342  0.606 0.606  0.648 0.644 
LVA  504  0.178 0.177 0.930 0.930 BLZ  335  0.216 0.216  0.618 0.618 
POL  504  0.198 0.198 0.930 0.930 MAR  334  0.255 0.255  0.616 0.616 
LTU  485  0.321 0.319 0.895 0.895 ZWE  331  0.122 0.122  0.611 0.611 
THA  475  0.265 0.262 0.876 0.876 TZA  329  0.282 0.282  0.607 0.607 
ROM  472  0.552 0.547 0.894 0.884 CMR  322  0.345 0.345  0.594 0.594 
MDA  464  0.220 0.218 0.856 0.856 MOZ  318  0.297 0.297  0.587 0.587 
MEX  455  0.382 0.377 0.850 0.842 SWZ  317  0.206 0.206  0.585 0.585 
TTO  454  0.652 0.644 0.860 0.857 MDG  315  0.293 0.293  0.581 0.581 
MKD  453  0.386 0.381 0.847 0.838 UGA  309  0.315 0.315  0.570 0.570 
JOR  439  0.211 0.208 0.810 0.810 BWA  288  0.107 0.107  0.531 0.531 
TUN  437  0.150 0.148 0.806 0.806 BFA  277  0.329 0.329  0.511 0.511 
IRN  435  0.289 0.284 0.803 0.803 CIV  269  0.269 0.269  0.496 0.496 
ARG  432  0.456 0.449 0.807 0.804 ZAF  261  0.149 0.149  0.482 0.482 
TUR  431  0.565 0.556 0.816 0.809 MLI  233  0.291 0.291  0.430 0.430 
BRA  428  0.456 0.448 0.800 0.797 NAM  232  0.113 0.113  0.428 0.428 
IDN  419  0.826 0.811 0.814 0.804 LSO  230  0.142 0.142  0.424 0.424 
CHL  407  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 ZMB  228  0.295 0.295  0.421 0.421 
PRY  406  0.288 0.288 0.749 0.749 SEN  223  0.277 0.277  0.411 0.411 
BOL  405  0.239 0.239 0.747 0.747 MWI  207  0.261 0.261  0.382 0.382 
COL  400  0.354 0.354 0.748 0.739 NER  173  0.292 0.292  0.319 0.319 
KWT  398  0.114 0.114 0.734 0.734            
Note: Data for learning scores are reproduced from Table 1.2. in Crouch and Fasih (2004). Sorted by 
learning scores. 
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Table B.3. Efficiency Score for Selected Education Indicator - Learning scores  
–  Including Developed Countries 
 
  Learning  Input efficiency Output  efficiency   Learning Input efficiency Output  efficiency
Country Scores FDH DEA FDH DEA  Country Scores FDH DEA FDH DEA 
NLD  543  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  IRN  435  0.747 0.747 0.801 0.801 
HUN  542  0.918 0.916 0.998 0.998  ARG  432  0.814 0.814 0.796 0.796 
SVK  535  0.956 0.936 0.985 0.985  TUR  431  0.806 0.806 0.794 0.794 
AUS  533  0.987 0.961 0.982 0.982  BRA  428  0.795 0.795 0.788 0.788 
AUT  533  0.755 0.735 0.982 0.982  IDN  419  0.815 0.815 0.772 0.772 
CAN  532  0.818 0.794 0.980 0.980  CHL  407  0.850 0.850 0.750 0.750 
CHE  531  0.807 0.781 0.978 0.978  PRY  406  0.745 0.745 0.748 0.748 
CZE  530  0.967 0.933 0.976 0.976  BOL  405  0.716 0.716 0.746 0.746 
SWE  529  0.555 0.534 0.974 0.974  COL  400  0.771 0.771 0.737 0.737 
FIN  528  0.682 0.654 0.972 0.972  KWT  398  0.636 0.636 0.733 0.733 
RUS  528  0.957 0.918 0.972 0.972  DOM  397  0.877 0.877 0.768 0.741 
GBR  517  1.000 0.972 1.000 0.981  HND  396  0.740 0.740 0.729 0.729 
BGR  515  0.931 0.899 0.948 0.948  PER  392  0.797 0.797 0.722 0.722 
FRA  515  0.724 0.699 0.948 0.948  VUT  375  0.655 0.655 0.691 0.691 
DEU  514  0.991 0.955 0.994 0.969  KEN  349  0.708 0.708 0.643 0.643 
USA  509  0.888 0.842 0.937 0.937  PHL  345  0.769 0.769 0.635 0.635 
MYS  506  0.760 0.715 0.932 0.932  MUS  342  0.826 0.826 0.630 0.630 
ESP  505  0.977 0.917 0.977 0.943  BLZ  335  0.712 0.712 0.617 0.617 
LVA  504  0.765 0.715 0.928 0.928  MAR  334  0.727 0.727 0.615 0.615 
POL  504  0.790 0.739 0.928 0.928  ZWE  331  0.617 0.617 0.610 0.610 
NZL  501  0.648 0.601 0.923 0.923  TZA  329  0.728 0.728 0.606 0.606 
NOR  500  0.486 0.449 0.921 0.921  CMR  322  0.753 0.753 0.593 0.593 
ISL  499  0.674 0.620 0.919 0.919  MOZ  318  0.735 0.735 0.586 0.586 
DNK  493  0.451 0.407 0.908 0.908  SWZ  317  0.703 0.703 0.584 0.584 
GRC  491  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  MDG  315  0.733 0.733 0.580 0.580 
ITA  486  0.876 0.876 0.940 0.906  UGA  309  0.742 0.742 0.569 0.569 
LTU  485  0.768 0.768 0.893 0.893  BWA  288  0.603 0.603 0.530 0.530 
THA  475  0.739 0.739 0.875 0.875  BFA  277  0.746 0.746 0.510 0.510 
PRT  474  0.663 0.663 0.873 0.873  CIV  269  0.727 0.727 0.495 0.495 
ROM  472  0.804 0.804 0.869 0.869  ZAF  261  0.668 0.668 0.481 0.481 
CYP  468  0.674 0.674 0.862 0.862  MLI  233  0.732 0.732 0.429 0.429 
ISR  467  0.498 0.498 0.860 0.860  NAM  232  0.610 0.610 0.427 0.427 
MDA  464  0.700 0.700 0.855 0.855  LSO  230  0.641 0.641 0.424 0.424 
MEX  455  0.785 0.785 0.838 0.838  ZMB  228  0.734 0.734 0.420 0.420 
TTO  454  0.825 0.825 0.836 0.836  SEN  223  0.730 0.730 0.411 0.411 
MKD  453  0.777 0.777 0.834 0.834  MWI  207  0.720 0.720 0.381 0.381 
JOR  439  0.702 0.702 0.808 0.808  NER  173  0.733 0.733 0.319 0.319 
TUN  437  0.657 0.657 0.805 0.805             
Note: Data for learning scores are reproduced from Table 1.2. in Crouch and Fasih (2004).  Sorted by 
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Table B.4  Efficiency Score for Selected Health Indicators 
  Life Expectancy at Birth  Immunization DPT 
 Input  Efficiency Output  Efficiency Input  Efficiency Output  Efficiency 
Country  FDH  DEA  FDH DEA FDH DEA FDH DEA 
AGO  0.671  0.671  0.609 0.607 0.671 0.671 0.368 0.368 
ALB  0.697  0.697  0.955 0.953 0.826 0.792 0.984 0.984 
ARE  1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 0.956 0.942 0.983 0.967 
ARG  0.527  0.492  0.955 0.955 0.478 0.478 0.811 0.811 
ARM  0.712  0.663  0.963 0.959 0.681 0.651 0.906 0.906 
ATG  0.744  0.736  0.980 0.978 0.800 0.794 0.997 0.997 
AZE  0.724  0.724  0.862 0.861 0.857 0.822 0.984 0.984 
BDI 0.638  0.638  0.549 0.547 0.638 0.638 0.746 0.746 
BEN  0.649  0.649  0.693 0.690 0.649 0.649 0.737 0.737 
BFA  0.647  0.647  0.580 0.577 0.647 0.647 0.405 0.405 
BGD  0.672  0.672  0.798 0.795 0.672 0.672 0.821 0.821 
BGR  0.619  0.619  0.931 0.926 0.652 0.650 0.954 0.954 
BHR  0.736  0.736  0.955 0.954 0.872 0.834 0.983 0.983 
BHS  0.755  0.755  0.907 0.906 0.795 0.770 0.921 0.921 
BLR  0.560  0.560  0.892 0.886 0.664 0.659 0.997 0.997 
BLZ 0.797  0.749  0.966 0.964 0.723 0.723 0.893 0.893 
BOL  0.633  0.633  0.816 0.812 0.633 0.633 0.714 0.714 
BRA  0.672  0.672  0.888 0.886 0.672 0.672 0.892 0.892 
BRB  0.721  0.632  0.987 0.979 0.556 0.556 0.899 0.899 
BWA  0.626  0.626  0.535 0.533 0.741 0.695 0.975 0.975 
CAF  0.649  0.649  0.571 0.569 0.649 0.649 0.436 0.436 
CHL  0.964  0.879  0.990 0.990 0.881 0.787 0.958 0.958 
CHN  0.717  0.717  0.917 0.916 0.717 0.717 0.890 0.890 
CIV 0.679  0.679  0.600 0.598 0.679 0.679 0.605 0.605 
CMR  0.694  0.694  0.661 0.659 0.694 0.694 0.482 0.482 
COG  0.648  0.648  0.670 0.667 0.648 0.648 0.317 0.317 
COL  0.623  0.623  0.931 0.927 0.623 0.623 0.773 0.773 
COM  0.664  0.664  0.792 0.790 0.664 0.664 0.701 0.701 
CPV  0.643  0.643  0.898 0.895 0.643 0.643 0.805 0.805 
CRI 1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 0.528 0.528 0.899 0.899 
CZE 0.386  0.372  0.964 0.964 0.414 0.402 0.988 0.988 
DJI  0.612  0.612  0.610 0.607 0.612 0.612 0.404 0.404 
DMA  0.749  0.728  0.997 0.990 0.684 0.682 0.999 0.999 
DOM  0.776  0.776  0.895 0.881 0.776 0.776 0.688 0.688 
DZA  0.696  0.696  0.920 0.918 0.734 0.700 0.905 0.905 
ECU  0.694  0.694  0.909 0.907 0.694 0.694 0.861 0.861 
EGY  0.715  0.715  0.884 0.883 0.753 0.747 0.948 0.948 
ERI 0.626  0.626  0.666 0.662 0.626 0.626 0.825 0.825 
EST 0.515  0.515  0.910 0.910 0.543 0.541 0.952 0.952 
ETH  0.644  0.644  0.556 0.554 0.644 0.644 0.482 0.482 
FJI  0.702  0.702  0.902 0.900 0.740 0.706 0.905 0.905 
GAB  0.804  0.804  0.700 0.691 0.804 0.804 0.452 0.452 
GEO  0.689  0.689  0.954 0.951 0.689 0.689 0.824 0.824   49
Table B.4 (continued) 
  Life Expectancy at Birth  Immunization DPT 
 Input  Efficiency Output  Efficiency Input  Efficiency Output  Efficiency 
Country  FDH  DEA  FDH DEA FDH DEA FDH DEA 
GHA  0.657  0.657  0.749 0.746 0.657 0.657 0.765 0.765 
GIN 0.671  0.671  0.605 0.604 0.671 0.671 0.470 0.470 
GMB  0.636  0.636  0.696 0.693 0.670 0.655 0.932 0.932 
GNB  0.632  0.632  0.585 0.583 0.632 0.632 0.495 0.495 
GRD  0.647  0.647  0.946 0.943 0.681 0.671 0.939 0.939 
GTM  0.714  0.714  0.848 0.847 0.714 0.714 0.788 0.788 
GUY  0.600  0.600  0.823 0.818 0.600 0.600 0.877 0.877 
HND  0.645  0.645  0.862 0.859 0.764 0.683 0.958 0.958 
HRV  0.380  0.380  0.945 0.945 0.400 0.394 0.939 0.939 
HTI 0.647  0.647  0.690 0.688 0.647 0.647 0.431 0.431 
HUN  0.450  0.450  0.921 0.921 0.533 0.533 1.000 1.000 
IDN 0.770  0.770  0.862 0.861 0.770 0.770 0.749 0.749 
IND 0.718  0.718  0.821 0.820 0.718 0.718 0.633 0.633 
IRN 0.740  0.740  0.898 0.897 0.877 0.857 0.991 0.991 
JAM  0.835  0.711  0.984 0.980 0.644 0.644 0.886 0.886 
JOR 0.585  0.585  0.934 0.928 0.693 0.634 0.967 0.967 
KAZ  0.725  0.725  0.838 0.836 0.858 0.807 0.977 0.977 
KEN  0.648  0.648  0.621 0.618 0.648 0.648 0.820 0.820 
KGZ  0.654  0.654  0.869 0.866 0.774 0.754 0.990 0.990 
KHM  0.678  0.678  0.704 0.702 0.678 0.678 0.518 0.518 
KNA  0.708  0.708  0.924 0.923 0.838 0.832 0.997 0.997 
KOR  1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
KWT  1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 0.914 0.863 0.978 0.978 
LAO  0.666  0.666  0.700 0.698 0.666 0.666 0.544 0.544 
LBN  0.712  0.712  0.919 0.918 0.750 0.737 0.937 0.937 
LCA  0.694  0.694  0.940 0.938 0.694 0.694 0.874 0.874 
LKA  0.715  0.715  0.952 0.951 0.847 0.800 0.978 0.978 
LSO 0.600  0.600  0.548 0.545 0.600 0.600 0.843 0.843 
LTU  0.546  0.546  0.938 0.930 0.575 0.566 0.939 0.939 
LVA  0.617  0.617  0.915 0.911 0.731 0.655 0.960 0.960 
MAR  0.739  0.739  0.883 0.882 0.779 0.775 0.951 0.951 
MDA  0.621  0.621  0.875 0.871 0.736 0.662 0.961 0.961 
MDG  0.646  0.646  0.713 0.710 0.646 0.646 0.540 0.540 
MEX  0.758  0.758  0.955 0.954 0.898 0.812 0.962 0.962 
MKD  0.501  0.501  0.941 0.941 0.527 0.525 0.952 0.952 
MLI 0.644  0.644  0.554 0.552 0.644 0.644 0.496 0.496 
MNG  0.615  0.615  0.850 0.846 0.647 0.643 0.949 0.949 
MOZ  0.625  0.625  0.562 0.559 0.625 0.625 0.606 0.606 
MRT  0.651  0.651  0.663 0.660 0.651 0.651 0.439 0.439 
MUS  0.936  0.936  0.973 0.955 0.936 0.936 0.937 0.932 
MWI  0.627  0.627  0.510 0.508 0.627 0.627 0.853 0.853 
MYS  0.949  0.949  0.989 0.975 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
NAM  0.543  0.543  0.628 0.623 0.543 0.543 0.723 0.723   50
Table B.4 (continued) 
  Life Expectancy at Birth  Immunization DPT 
 Input  Efficiency Output  Efficiency Input  Efficiency Output  Efficiency 
Country  FDH  DEA  FDH DEA FDH DEA FDH DEA 
NER  0.646  0.646  0.591 0.589 0.646 0.646 0.264 0.264 
NGA  0.659  0.659  0.620 0.617 0.659 0.659 0.290 0.290 
NIC 0.628  0.628  0.895 0.891 0.661 0.634 0.909 0.909 
NPL 0.658  0.658  0.767 0.764 0.658 0.658 0.733 0.733 
OMN  0.931  0.858  0.976 0.970 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
PAK  0.693  0.693  0.821 0.819 0.693 0.693 0.582 0.582 
PAN  0.579  0.559  0.965 0.965 0.553 0.553 0.955 0.955 
PER 0.700  0.700  0.905 0.903 0.737 0.710 0.915 0.915 
PHL 0.748  0.748  0.904 0.904 0.748 0.748 0.769 0.769 
PNG  0.628  0.628  0.748 0.744 0.628 0.628 0.541 0.541 
POL 0.550  0.550  0.954 0.946 0.651 0.634 0.990 0.990 
PRY  0.676  0.676  0.918 0.916 0.676 0.676 0.723 0.723 
ROM  0.558  0.558  0.908 0.902 0.661 0.644 0.990 0.990 
RUS  0.617  0.617  0.864 0.860 0.650 0.635 0.931 0.931 
RWA  0.636  0.636  0.523 0.521 0.636 0.636 0.847 0.847 
SAU  0.615  0.615  0.946 0.941 0.648 0.645 0.951 0.951 
SDN  0.685  0.685  0.749 0.747 0.685 0.685 0.473 0.473 
SEN 0.640  0.640  0.684 0.681 0.640 0.640 0.582 0.582 
SLB 0.607  0.607  0.894 0.890 0.607 0.607 0.801 0.801 
SLE 0.635  0.635  0.488 0.486 0.635 0.635 0.449 0.449 
SLV 0.634  0.634  0.912 0.908 0.668 0.664 0.949 0.949 
SVK  0.464  0.464  0.944 0.944 0.549 0.549 1.000 1.000 
SVN  0.380  0.375  0.971 0.971 0.363 0.357 0.939 0.939 
SWZ  0.710  0.710  0.631 0.630 0.710 0.710 0.804 0.804 
SYR  0.699  0.699  0.910 0.908 0.736 0.735 0.955 0.955 
TCD  0.642  0.642  0.633 0.631 0.642 0.642 0.264 0.264 
TGO  0.660  0.660  0.644 0.641 0.660 0.660 0.564 0.564 
THA  0.786  0.786  0.913 0.900 0.931 0.859 0.970 0.970 
TJK 0.650  0.650  0.884 0.881 0.650 0.650 0.827 0.827 
TKM  0.639  0.639  0.851 0.848 0.757 0.726 0.984 0.984 
TON  0.655  0.655  0.927 0.924 0.776 0.696 0.960 0.960 
TTO  0.883  0.883  0.964 0.962 0.930 0.903 0.965 0.939 
TUN  0.547  0.547  0.942 0.934 0.648 0.598 0.970 0.970 
TUR  0.627  0.627  0.908 0.904 0.627 0.627 0.811 0.811 
TZA  0.634  0.634  0.589 0.587 0.634 0.634 0.821 0.821 
UGA  0.647  0.647  0.556 0.554 0.647 0.647 0.586 0.586 
UKR  0.650  0.650  0.887 0.884 0.770 0.767 0.999 0.999 
URY  0.570  0.540  0.959 0.959 0.544 0.531 0.929 0.929 
UZB  0.639  0.639  0.889 0.885 0.757 0.726 0.984 0.984 
VCT  0.613  0.613  0.953 0.948 0.725 0.715 0.994 0.994 
VEN  0.724  0.661  0.958 0.954 0.657 0.657 0.633 0.633 
VNM  0.681  0.681  0.901 0.899 0.717 0.701 0.931 0.931 
VUT  0.683  0.683  0.889 0.887 0.683 0.683 0.807 0.807   51
Table B.4 (continued) 
  Life Expectancy at Birth  Immunization DPT 
 Input  Efficiency Output  Efficiency Input  Efficiency Output  Efficiency 
Country  FDH  DEA  FDH DEA FDH DEA FDH DEA 
WSM  0.582  0.582  0.902 0.896 0.689 0.646 0.975 0.975 
YEM  0.646  0.646  0.736 0.733 0.646 0.646 0.662 0.662 
ZAF 0.620  0.620  0.645 0.642 0.620 0.620 0.784 0.784 
ZAR  0.648  0.648  0.599 0.597 0.648 0.648 0.280 0.280 
ZMB  0.629  0.629  0.511 0.509 0.629 0.629 0.811 0.811 
ZWE  0.595  0.595  0.535 0.532 0.595 0.595 0.791 0.791 
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Table B.5. List of Countries 
Code Region Country  Code Region Country  Code  Region Country 
AGO  AFR Angola  GMB AFR Gambia,  The  OMN  MNA  Oman 
ALB ECA  Albania  GNB AFR  Guinea-Bissau PAK  SAS  Pakistan 
ARE  MNA  United Arab Emirates GRD  LAC  Grenada  PAN  LAC  Panama 
ARG  LAC Argentina  GTM LAC Guatemala  PER  LAC Peru 
ARM  ECA Armenia  GUY LAC Guyana  PHL  EAP Philippines 
ATG  LAC  Antigua and Barbuda HND LAC  Honduras  PNG  EAP  Papua New Guinea 
AZE  ECA Azerbaijan  HRV  ECA Croatia  POL  ECA Poland 
BDI  AFR Burundi  HTI  LAC Haiti  PRY  LAC Paraguay 
BEN  AFR Benin  HUN ECA Hungary  ROM  ECA Romania 
BFA AFR  Burkina  Faso  IDN EAP  Indonesia RUS  ECA  Russian  Federation 
BGD  SAS Bangladesh  IND  SAS India  RWA  AFR Rwanda 
BGR  ECA  Bulgaria  IRN  MNA Iran,  Islamic  Rep.  SAU MNA Saudi  Arabia 
BHR MNA  Bahrain  JAM LAC  Jamaica  SDN  AFR  Sudan 
BHS LAC  Bahamas,  The  JOR MNA  Jordan  SEN  AFR  Senegal 
BLR  ECA Belarus  KAZ  ECA Kazakhstan  SLB  EAP Solomon  Islands 
BLZ  LAC Belize  KEN  AFR Kenya  SLE  AFR Sierra  Leone 
BOL  LAC Bolivia  KGZ  ECA Kyrgyz  Republic  SLV  LAC El  Salvador 
BRA  LAC Brazil  KHM EAP Cambodia  SVK  ECA Slovak  Republic 
BRB  LAC  Barbados  KNA LAC  St. Kitts and Nevis  SVN  ECA  Slovenia 
BWA  AFR Botswana  KOR  EAP Korea,  Rep.  SWZ  AFR Swaziland 
CAF  AFR  Central African Rep.  KWT MNA  Kuwait  SYR  MNA  Syrian Arab Republic 
CHL LAC  Chile  LAO EAP  Lao  PDR  TCD  AFR  Chad 
CHN EAP  China  LBN MNA  Lebanon  TGO  AFR  Togo 
CIV  AFR  Cote d'Ivoire  LCA  LAC  St. Lucia  THA  EAP  Thailand 
CMR AFR  Cameroon  LKA SAS  Sri  Lanka  TJK  ECA  Tajikistan 
COG  AFR Congo,  Rep.  LSO  AFR Lesotho  TKM  ECA Turkmenistan 
COL  LAC Colombia  LTU  ECA Lithuania  TON  EAP Tonga 
COM AFR  Comoros  LVA ECA  Latvia  TTO  LAC  Trinidad and Tobago 
CPV  AFR  Cape  Verde  MAR MNA Morocco  TUN  MNA Tunisia 
CRI  LAC Costa  Rica  MDA ECA Moldova  TUR  ECA Turkey 
CZE  ECA Czech  Republic  MDG AFR Madagascar  TZA  AFR Tanzania 
DJI MNA Djibouti  MEX LAC  Mexico  UGA  AFR  Uganda 
DMA  LAC Dominica  MKD ECA Macedonia, FYR  UKR  ECA  Ukraine 
DOM  LAC Dominican  Republic  MLI  AFR Mali  URY  LAC Uruguay 
DZA MNA  Algeria  MNG EAP  Mongolia UZB  ECA  Uzbekistan 
ECU  LAC Ecuador  MOZ AFR Mozambique  VCT  LAC St.  Vincent  &  Grenadines 
EGY  MNA  Egypt, Arab Rep.  MRT AFR  Mauritania  VEN  LAC  Venezuela, RB 
ERI  AFR Eritrea  MUS AFR Mauritius  VNM  EAP Vietnam 
EST ECA  Estonia  MWI AFR  Malawi  VUT EAP  Vanuatu 
ETH  AFR Ethiopia  MYS EAP Malaysia  WSM  EAP Samoa 
FJI EAP  Fiji  NAM AFR Namibia  YEM  MNA  Yemen,  Rep. 
GAB  AFR Gabon  NER  AFR Niger  ZAF  AFR South  Africa 
GEO  ECA Georgia  NGA AFR Nigeria  ZAR  AFR Congo,  Dem.  Rep. 
GHA  AFR Ghana  NIC  LAC Nicaragua  ZMB  AFR Zambia 
GIN  AFR Guinea  NPL  SAS Nepal  ZWE  AFR Zimbabwe   53
Table B.5. Continued 
Developed countries included in the efficiency estimation for learning scores 
Code Country  Code Country Code  Country 
AUS Australia  ESP Spain  LUX  Luxembourg 
AUT Austria  FIN  Finland  NLD  Netherlands 
CAN Canada  FRA France  NOR  Norway 
CHE  Switzerland  GBR  United Kingdom  NZL  New Zealand 
CYP Cyprus  GRC Greece  SWE Sweden 
DEU Germany  ISL  Iceland  USA  United  States 
DNK Denmark  ITA  Italy     
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Table B.6. Definition and Source of Variables 
Definition of Variable   Source 
Output variables for education   
School enrollment, primary (% gross)   World Bank WDI 
School enrollment, primary (% net)   World Bank WDI 
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)   World Bank WDI 
School enrollment, secondary (% net)   World Bank WDI 
Literacy rate, youth total (% of people ages 15-24)   World Bank WDI 
Average years of school, ages 15+  Barro-Lee Database 
First level complete, ages 15+  Barro-Lee Database 
second level complete, ages 15+  Barro-Lee Database 
Learning scores  Crouch and Fasih (2004) 
Input variables for education  
Public education spending per capita in PPP terms, calculated  World Bank WDI 
Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above)   World Bank WDI 
Teachers per pupil, equal the reciprocal of pupils per teacher  World Bank WDI 
Output variables for health  
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)   World Bank WDI 
Immunization, DPT (% of children ages 12-23 months)   World Bank WDI 
Immunization, measles (% of children ages 12-23 months)   World Bank WDI 
Disability Adjusted Life Expectancy  Mathers et al (2000) 
Input variables for health  
Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above)   World Bank WDI 
public spending on health per capita in PPP terms, calculated  World Bank WDI 
public spending on health per capita in PPP terms, calculated  World Bank WDI 
Variables used in the calculation  World Bank WDI 
Pupil-teacher ratio, primary   World Bank WDI 
Public spending on education, total (% of GDP)   World Bank WDI 
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 1995 international $)   World Bank WDI 
Health expenditure, private (% of GDP)   World Bank WDI 
Health expenditure, public (% of GDP)   World Bank WDI 
Variables used in the Panel Tobit regression   
Wages and salaries (% of total public expenditure)  World Bank WDI 
Total government expenditure (% of GDP)  World Bank WDI 
Share of expenditures publicly financed (public/total)  World Bank WDI 
GDP per capita in constant 1995 US dollars  World Bank WDI 
Urban population (% of total)  World Bank WDI 
Dummy variable for HIV/AIDS  WHO mappings of diseases
Gini Coefficient  World Bank WDI 
Aid (% of fiscal revenue) calculated as Official development assistance  
            and official aid (current US$) *official exchange rate * PPP conversion factor  
            / Revenue, excluding grants (current LCU) 
World Bank WDI 
Institutional Indicators  including 
a.  State Failure data  
b.  ICRG International Country Risk Indicators    
c.  Worldwide Governance Research Indicators  
a. The State Failure Task 
Force 
b. ICRG Online Website 
c. Kaufmann, et al. 1999a,b 
and 2002   55
Figure B.  1.  Efficiency Frontiers for Education 
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Data Source: World Bank WDI
Net Secondary Enrollment vs Education Expenditure 
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1.  Figures are correlation coefficients from Spearman test, number of observations are in parentheses. 
2.  All coefficients are significant at 1% level, unless indicated otherwise, * 2% significance, ** 5% significance, *** 10% significance, # 
insignificant   58












































































































































































































1.  Figures are correlation coefficients from Spearman test, number of observations are in parentheses. 
2.  All coefficients are significant at 1% level, unless indicated otherwise, * 2% significance, ** 5% significance, *** 10% significance, # 
insignificant   59












































































































































































































1.  Figures are correlation coefficients from Spearman test, number of observations are in parentheses. 
2.  All coefficients are significant at 1% level, unless indicated otherwise, * 2% significance, ** 5% significance, *** 10% significance, # 
insignificant   60












































































































































































































1.  Figures are correlation coefficients from Spearman test, number of observations are in parentheses. 
2.  All coefficients are significant at 1% level, unless indicated otherwise, * 2% significance, ** 5% significance, *** 10% significance, # 
insignificant   61
Bt 
Appendix D. Productivity Change Over Time 
 
Malmquist indexes are defined using distance functions. These functions describe 
multiple input-multiple output production technologies based on input and output 
quantity data without price information or behavioral assumptions (i.e. cost minimization 
or profit maximization). The distance functions can be either output based or input based.  
 
The output distance function can be defined for any production technology S
t  as  the 
reciprocal of the maximum proportional expansion of the output vector y, given inputs x. 
[ ] ) ) , ( : sup(
1
) , ( : inf ) , ( t t S yt xt S yt















t, then Do≤ 1 and  Do= 1 if and only if (x
t, y
t) is on the boundary or frontier 
of technology. The distance function is the reciprocal of the output efficiency measure 
defined by Farrell and used in previous sections. 
 
In Figure D.1, the frontier of the transformation set is defined by (Bt, Ct) in period t and 
by (Bt+1, Ct+1) in period t+1. The distance of country A from the country B in period t, 
which is a measure of how far the production point A is from the frontier, can be 
expressed as  t t
t t t OB OA y x D / ) , ( = . Similarly, the distance between the production point 
At+1 and the frontier in period t+1 is defined as  1 1
1 1 1 / ) , ( + +
+ + + = t t



















Figure D. 1. Output Possibility Set, periods t and t+1 
 
The Malmquist index requires the definition of a distance function with respect to two 
different time periods (t and t+1).  This distance measures the maximum change in 
outputs required to make (x
t+1, y
t+1) feasible in relation to technology at t, and is defined 
as t t
t t t OB OA y x D / ) , ( 1
1 1
+
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Bt 
the change in output required to make (x
t, y
t) feasible in relation to technology at t+1.  
This would be  defined as 1
1 / ) , ( +
+ = t t
t t t OB OA y x D . Hence the Malmquist productivity 
index is defined as the ratio of two distances, that can be computed in relation with 
technology at t or at t+1.  The period t -based and period (t+1)-based Malmquist indices 























=    (D.3) 
 
 
One possible case in reality is that the frontier shift is not parallel in all dimensions, as 
indicated in Figure D.2. Country B in period t+1 is producing more y1 and less y2 
compared to the production point in period t. In another word, the country B is not 
expanding along the same ray through the origin, but rather biased in some direction, as 
pointed by Nin, Arndt, and Preckel (2003) among others. In this case, the output-oriented, 
period t-based Malmquist index will estimate productivity decrease due to technical 




















Figure D. 2 Contemporaneous Production Set (Biased Technical Change) 
  
To avoid an arbitrary selection of base period mentioned above, the geometric average  of 
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The ratio outside the brackets captures the change in relative efficiency between the two 
time periods. The term in the brackets captures the  technological shift between the two 
periods. This expression is the basis of our empirical application, following Coelli and 
Rao (2003).   
 
An alternative approach to dealing with the biased technical change is to define a 
sequential production set, following Nin, Arndt, and Preckel (2003). Specifically, it is 
assumed that the input-output mix, or technology, in period t is always available in period 
t+1. The production possibility set, the sequential one, in period t+1 is then defined by 
the frontier (Bt, Bt+1) in Figure D.3. This setup will clearly rule out the possibility of 
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Variable Returns to Scale Efficiency and Sequential Technical Change 
Table D.1.  Education, single input (public spending per capita on education), single output 
VRSTE Output  VRSTE Input   Region 
1975-80 1996-02  1975-80  1996-02 
EFFCH TECHCH  TFPCH No.  of 
Countries 
AFR  .563  .650 .843  .851 1.299 1  1.299 23 
EAP  .793 .808  .897  .847  .987 1  .987 8 
ECA  .754 .735  .845  .793  .944 1  .944 4 
LAC  .787  .813 .860  .843 1.054 1  1.054 20 




SAS  .554  .769 .882  .911 1.446 1  1.446 5 
AFR  .537  .651 .841  .819 1.355 1  1.355 12 
EAP  .929 .959  .927  .859  .969 1  .969 4 
ECA  .958 .907  .792  .799  .963 1  .963 2 
LAC  .870  .935 .837  .831 1.045 1  1.045 13 
MNA  .752  .842 .787  .724 1.198 1  1.198 9 
Net Primary 
Enrollment 
SAS  - -  -  -  - -  - - 
AFR  .184  .293 .819  .830 2.072 1.038  2.150 23 
EAP  .508  .705 .874  .860 1.484 1.038  1.540 8 
ECA  .750  .864 .913  .854 1.235 1.038  1.281 4 
LAC  .564  .723 .859  .874 1.450 1.038  1.505 20 




SAS  .324  .478 .880  .901 1.806 1.038  1.874 5 
AFR  .179  .341 .317  .304 1.519 1.248  1.895 6 
EAP  .576  .695 .525  .623 1.555 1.248  1.941 3 
ECA  .824  .895 .747  .711 1.256 1.248  1.568 1 
LAC  .535  .678 .504  .451 1.420 1.248  1.772 10 




SAS  - -  -  -  - -  - - 
AFR  .554  .741 .814  .831 1.442 1  1.442 20 
EAP  .924  .988 .879  .868 1.009 1  1.009 6 
ECA  .967 .990  .940  .880  .967 1  .967 4 
LAC  .899  .952 .872  .845 1.024 1  1.024 18 
MNA  .729  .906 .778  .749 1.230 1  1.230 10 
Literacy of 
Youth 
SAS  .499  .662 .869  .871 1.430 1  1.430 5 
AFR  .261  .323 .340  .315 1.737 1  1.737 19 
EAP  .653  .708 .406  .495 1.342 1  1.342 7 
ECA  .750  .768 .648  .621 1.387 1  1.387 3 
LAC  .618  .625 .418  .427 1.300 1  1.300 18 




SAS  .302  .397 .363  .379 2.137 1  2.137 5 
AFR  .135  .164 .340  .315 1.417 1  1.417 19 
EAP  .367  .382 .363  .342 1.066 1  1.066 7 
ECA  .764 .639  .646  .528  .913 1  .913 3 
LAC  .372 .266  .404  .349  .816 1  .816 18 
MNA  .299  .217 .389  .317 1.266 1  1.266 6 
First Level 
Complete 
SAS  .146  .194 .363  .370 2.101 1  2.101 5 
AFR  .082  .098 .341  .339 1.417 1.77  2.509 19 
EAP .439  .444  .470  .517  .991  1.77  1.754  7 
ECA  .284  .276 .355  .414 1.045 1.77  1.849 3 
LAC .337  .228  .418  .381  .839  1.77  1.485  18 




SAS  .202  .235 .385  .424 1.734 1.77  3.068 5   65
 
Table D.2 Health, Single Input (Public Spending per capita on Health), Single Output  
 
VRSTE Output  VRSTE Input   Region 
1997-99 2000-02  1997-99  2000-02 
EFFCH TECHCH  TFPCH No.  of 
Countries 
AFR  .642 .618  .680  .681  .972 1  .972 42 
EAP  .870  .872 .738  .735 1.008 1  1.008 16 
ECA  .919  .911 .616  .626 1.019 1  1.019 25 
LAC  .923 .920  .739  .723  .995 1  .995 31 




SAS  .821  .834 .713  .718 1.029 1  1.029 5 
AFR  .601  .629 .686  .682 1.022 1.078  1.101 42 
EAP .837  .824  .772  .740  .930  1.078  1.003  16 
ECA .949  .957  .681  .633  .953  1.078  1.027  25 
LAC .863  .883  .732  .694  .944  1.078  1.017  31 
MNA  .882  .920 .778  .751 1.063 1.078  1.146 13 
Immunization 
DPT 
SAS .742  .773  .736  .724  .976  1.078  1.053  5 
AFR .632  .638  .682  .681  .975  1.089  1.061  42 
EAP .837  .827  .778  .740  .924  1.089  1.007  16 
ECA .944  .951  .712  .634  .943  1.089  1.027  25 
LAC .904  .912  .770  .694  .924  1.089  1.006  31 
MNA  .878  .909 .798  .755 1.055 1.089  1.148 13 
Immunization 
Measles 
SAS .701  .732  .735  .725  .970  1.089  1.056  5 
AFR  .655  -  .563  -  - -  - 41 
EAP  .717  -  .830  -  - -  - 16 
ECA  .602  -  .903  -  - -  - 26 
LAC  .698  -  .904  -  - -  - 31 
MNA  .707  -  .863  -  - -  - 15 
DALE 
SAS  .691  -  .787  -  - -  - 5 
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Table D.3. Education, Multiple Inputs, Multiple Outputs  
VRSTE Output  VRSTE Input   Region 
1975-80 1996-02  1975-80  1996-02 
EFFCH TECHCH  TFPCH No.  of 
Countries 
AFR  .587  .685 .906  .902 1.292 1.003  1.296 21 
EAP  .860  .928 .935  .905 1.039 1.030  1.070 7 
ECA  .913 .939  .913  .842  .937 1.065  .999 3 
LAC  .854  .911 .906  .914 1.102 1.029  1.134 20 






SAS  .580  .817 .940  .963 1.457 1.101  1.470 5 
AFR  .723  .703 .787  .750 1.062 1.009  1.076 6 
EAP  .921  .954 .905  .881 1.015 1.074  1.088 3 
ECA 1.00  .973  1.00  .836  .999  1.299  1.298  1 
LAC  .881  .942 .808  .822 1.074 1.066  1.138 9 






SAS  - -  -  -  - -  - - 
AFR  .762  .922 .909  .909 1.043 1.002  1.045 18 
EAP  .840  .929 .896  .896 1.066 1.022  1.089 6 
ECA  .913  .917 .909  .909 1.018 1.037  1.057 3 
LAC  .849  .919 .922  .922 1.116 1.021  1.139 18 






SAS  .813  .966 .982  .982 1.140 1.010  1.153 5 
AFR  .909 .894  .924  .897  .953 1.014  .970 6 
EAP  .937  .981 .961  .959 1.030 1.021  1.052 2 
ECA 1.00  .996  1.00  .969  .916  1.300  1.192  1 
LAC  .964  .983 .931  .948 1.045 1.063  1.109 9 






SAS  - -  -  -  - -  - - 
AFR  .939 .946  .950  .944  .974 1.018  .991 18 
EAP  .995 .996  .989  .968  .961 1.026  .986 6 
ECA  .999 1.00  .993  .996  .959 1.029  .987 3 
LAC .968  .983  .966  .960  .996  1.023  1.019  18 








SAS  .919  .930 .970  .983 1.027 1.007  1.036 5 
AFR  .789  .724 .896  .876 1.025 1.167  1.201 15 
EAP .902  .872  .942  .901  .989  1.279  1.256  6 
ECA  .957  .987 .962  .978 1.026 1.137  1.168 2 
LAC .893  .846  .939  .883  .999  1.170  1.168  17 
MNA .899  .811  .925  .827  .950  1.259  1.193  6 
EDU3-3bl 




Complete  SAS  .883  .888 .984  .956 1.129 1.375  1.547 5 
AFR  .416  .451 .725  .733 1.560 1.054  1.641 17 
EAP  .730  .778 .747  .732 1.064 1.106  1.178 7 
ECA  .938 .943  .873  .773  .885 1.047  .922 2 
LAC  .690  .690 .777  .713 1.070 1.072  1.146 18 
MNA  .496  .576 .661  .599 1.393 1.105  1.509 6 
EDU2-3bl 




Complete  SAS  .328  .510 .673  .808 2.189 1.086  2.378 5 
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Table D.4. Health, Multiple Inputs and Multiple Outputs 
  
VRSTE Output  VRSTE Input   Region 
1997-99 2000-02  1997-99  2000-02 
EFFCH TECHCH  TFPCH No.  of 
Countries 
AFR  .818 .802  .861  .842  .952 1.032  .982 31 
EAP .899  .897  .853  .818  .950  1.055  1.001  9 
ECA .966  .965  .755  .730  .954  1.063  1.014  18 
LAC  .941 .936  .843  .824  .950 1.051  .998 23 






SAS  .957 .956  .939  .907  .965 1.032  .995 4 
AFR  .823 .805  .866  .842  .952 1.031  .982 31 
EAP .904  .903  .853  .818  .950  1.054  1.001  9 
ECA .970  .969  .763  .736  .957  1.059  1.013  18 
LAC  .948 .943  .862  .838  .950 1.051  .998 23 






SAS  .957 .957  .939  .907  .970 1.031  .999 4 
AFR  .820 .787  .866  .838  .934 1.029  .961 31 
EAP .900  .898  .860  .817  .937  1.069  1.001  9 
ECA .971  .970  .798  .739  .942  1.078  1.015  18 
LAC  .957 .953  .887  .848  .941 1.062  .998 23 






SAS .952  .957  .937  .906  .962  1.046  1.005  4 
AFR  .830 .812  .868  .842  .952 1.031  .981 31 
EAP .904  .903  .860  .819  .941  1.064  1.001  9 
ECA .977  .974  .800  .740  .944  1.075  1.013  18 
LAC  .958 .954  .887  .848  .941 1.062  .998 23 
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